nuclear weapons

Thinking seriously about Asia's arms control

The time to think seriously about the prospects for controlling Asia’s nuclear arsenals has arrived, writes Dr Benjamin Zala

Testing the Nuclear Stability-Instability Paradox Using Synthetic Control Method

Does acquisition of nuclear weapons by security rivals increase their level of conventional militarised conflict? Some recent theoretical and quantitative work has supported the ‘stability-instability paradox’, the proposition that while nuclear weapons deter nuclear war, they may also provide the conditions for nuclear-armed rivals to increase conventional military conflict with each other. However, other quantitative analysis and qualitative studies of the India–Pakistan dyad have delivered more equivocal assessments.

Asia-Pacific: The New Nuclear Fault Line?

Benjamin Zala, ‘Asia-Pacific: The New Nuclear Fault Line?’, Security Challenges, 3(1) 2007: 9-15.

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