Working Paper 2010/2

International Relations in Australia: Michael Lindsay, Martin Wight, and the first Department at the Australian National University

JAMES COTTON

Canberra, August 2010
The Department’s Working Paper series provides readers with access to current research on international relations. Reflecting the Department’s intellectual profile, the series includes topics on the general theoretical and empirical study of international and global politics, the political dynamics and developments in the Asia–Pacific region, and the intersection between the two.

The Working Papers series provides a vehicle for the circulation of work-in-progress, one objective being to enable authors to gain feedback before completion of their projects. Circulation of manuscripts as Working Papers does not preclude their subsequent publication as journal articles or book chapters.

Unless otherwise stated, publications of the Department of International Relations are presented without endorsement as contributions to the public record and debate. Authors are responsible for their own analysis and conclusions.
Abstract

Although he was an original member from 1951 of the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University (ANU), Michael Lindsay’s contribution to the discipline and to the ANU is rarely acknowledged. He is probably best known from the brief account given in the official ANU history of the second appointment to the chair. The candidate in question was Martin Wight, then reader at the London School of Economics. Having accepted the position, Wight later withdrew in controversial circumstances. In the official history it is claimed that Lindsay ‘wrote to him in terms that scared him away’. In the contemporary international relations discipline, Wight, by contrast, is regarded as one of the most influential figures of his generation. For those with any awareness of this episode, Lindsay’s role as, apparently, the person responsible for this path not taken is generally regarded as negative. The account offered in the official history has obscured two important points. First, setting aside issues of personality, it can be shown that Lindsay’s correspondence with Wight and any differences they might have had were based upon a coherent view on Lindsay’s part of the discipline and also of the work that was most appropriate to the new institution. Second, the record shows that, as he was the acting head of the Department for much of the 1950s, Lindsay played a large role in establishing its character, and was indeed immensely active, despite his junior status, in fostering interest in the discipline in the ANU and the wider community. This paper shows Lindsay to have played a strong and creative role in the discipline, one which should be more remembered and celebrated today.
INTRODUCTION

Although he was an original member from 1951 of the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University (ANU), Michael Lindsay’s contribution to the discipline in Australia and to the ANU is rarely acknowledged. He is probably best known by contemporary scholars from the brief account given in the official history of the ANU’s first five decades which is devoted to the second appointment to the chair. The candidate in question was Martin Wight, then reader at the London School of Economics, who was offered the professorship in 1957. Having accepted the position, Wight later withdrew in controversial circumstances. In the history it is stated, by way of explanation, that Lindsay ‘wrote to him in terms that scared him away’ (Foster and Varghese 1996: 109). As this passage follows a reference to Lindsay as seeing himself as the ‘victim of an injustice’ due to his lack of promotion and as having gone to the extent of publicising his grievances, the inference likely to be drawn is that his actions could be attributed to

* Professor, Politics Program, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, UNSW@ADFA, <j.cotton@adfa.edu.au>. Notes on sources: Where not specifically indicated, the account of the events referred to in this paper is based upon the collection of historical ANU documents held in the Butlin Archives, ANU (ANUA series, 8, 19, 44, 53, 57, 88). Where an item is marked ‘Lindsay Papers’, it is to be found in the un-catalogued but extensive collection of Michael Lindsay’s materials held by the Lindsay family. Many but not all of the relevant papers are found in a folder labelled Guoli Daxue (National University). I am indebted to the Lindsay family and especially Susan Lawrence for kindly permitting my access to this collection. The Walter Crocker papers are held by the Library of the University of Adelaide (Barr-Smith Library, SR327 C938p). Professors George Modelski and Richard Rosecrance have been generous in sharing their views on the Lindsay era in the Department. Dr Doug Munro has assisted with useful materials. I am also obliged to Dr John Burton for his reminiscences of the events of 1952 and to Professor William Tow for his interest in this project.
personal animus. This impression is reinforced in the account offered of his relationship with W. K. (Sir Keith) Hancock, Director of the Research School of Social Sciences from 1957, where the judgement on Lindsay is that his case served as an example of ‘how an individual could undermine the orderly procedures of academic life’ (Foster and Varghese 1996: 133).

In the contemporary international relations discipline, Wight, by contrast, is regarded as one of the most influential figures of his generation. Thanks in large measure to the efforts of his one time colleague Hedley Bull, later himself an occupant of an ANU chair, Wight’s posthumous publications have earned him recognition as the key founder of ‘the English school’ and as a scholar of the first rank, even while the more precise legacy of his largely theoretical work remains disputed (Bull 1977; Dunne 1998: 47–70; Hall 2006). The history of the discipline in Australia would no doubt have been very different had Wight made the journey. For those with any comprehension of this episode, Lindsay’s role as, apparently, the person responsible for this path not taken is generally regarded as negative.

Although the claim made in the official history can be disputed, as will be discussed below, its entry into the record has served to obscure two important points. First, setting aside issues of personality (invariably difficult in an academic context), it can be shown that Lindsay’s correspondence with Wight and any differences they might have had were based upon a coherent view on Lindsay’s part of the discipline and also of the work that was most appropriate to the new institution, but those intellectual and philosophical issues are excluded from the contemporary remembrance of this episode. Second, the record shows that, as he was the acting head of the Department for much of the 1950s, Lindsay played a large role in establishing its character, and was indeed immensely active in fostering interest in the discipline. In the earliest years his two other colleagues were absentees, and given that he did not occupy a senior position in what was then an extremely hierarchic organisation, he faced a difficult task in defending and developing his Department and its work. This paper is devoted, then, to elaborating those neglected issues. Lindsay is shown to have played a strong and creative role in the discipline, one which should be more remembered and celebrated today.
WALTER CROCKER AND MICHAEL LINDSAY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The first occupant of the chair in international relations at the ANU was Walter Crocker. The current literature rarely acknowledges Crocker, beyond noting the fact that he soon departed from the University on the invitation of R. G. Casey to become, in April 1952, High Commissioner to India. Crocker, however, though with considerable experience in the League of Nations and in the United Nations (UN), was much more than a diplomat. By the standards of the time he was a very well published scholar, with four books to his name and the first (and for long the only) Australian to publish in *International Organization* (Crocker 1950). A somewhat acerbic individual, privately scathing in his judgement of many of the university’s founding figures, including the Vice-Chancellor, D. B. Copland, Crocker soon fell out with a number of the early academics in the social sciences. In the event, he had insufficient time to establish the discipline at the ANU despite having carefully studied its teaching and organisation elsewhere and having developed clear ideas about its role at the new university.1 Even before Crocker arrived, the ANU had appointed Japan scholar Richard Storry to a research position. Storry prepared his best known work, on the origins of Japanese ultra-nationalism (1957), while at the ANU, but as he spent much of his time in Japan he made little impact before his departure in early 1955. Crocker’s only appointment was Lindsay.

Though not student contemporaries, Crocker had met the younger Lindsay while at Balliol College Oxford, where A. D. (Lord) Lindsay was Master and where, as is evident from his personal papers, Crocker became an intimate of the Lindsay family (Crocker 1981: 27–32). Although in his 1991 memoir Crocker states that he found a position for Lindsay as a favour to Lindsay’s father, Crocker’s papers contain a warm personal correspondence dating from 1935 which suggests that the initiative might well have come from Crocker himself.2 Crocker had attempted to find Lindsay a position in the UN in 1948 but was unsuccessful; he wrote to

---

1 D. B. Copland to Alan Watt, 15 November 1950; Walter Crocker to Vice-Chancellor, 7 April 1954: ANU Archives, File 6.5.4.0.

Lindsay in July 1949 seeking a curriculum vitae which he could put in front of the ANU Academic Advisers then meeting regularly in London. Lindsay was in China and he was evidently slow to reply; in the event the position in question, Reader in Chinese studies, was offered to C. P. Fitzgerald. Crocker undertook to find another position, writing a series of letters revealing to Lindsay the proceedings, delicate and strictly confidential, that lay behind these appointments to the fledgling university. From these letters it is clear that Crocker went to very considerable pains to give Lindsay the best chance, and once an offer was to be made (a formal letter to that effect was eventually sent on 9 January 1951) advised Lindsay on his best bargaining position. Crocker’s later memoir has the effect of placing a distance between the two which is not supported by the evidence. It should be emphasised that at this stage there was no formal procedure for appointments to the new university which were generally made as a result of direct invitation.

After graduating from Oxford having attended Balliol College, Lindsay had an interesting and varied career, including survey work in South Wales, graduate study at Cambridge, teaching economics at Peking (then Yanjing) University where he seems to have been the first to introduce Keynesian ideas into China (Trescott 1966), repairing radio sets for the communist underground, and after December 1941 spending nearly four years with the communist forces fighting the Japanese occupiers (Lindsay 2007). Married to one of his former students, two of his children were born in the region under communist rule, and Michael had become closely acquainted with the communist leadership. In retrospect, his knowledge and experience were ideally suited to the avowed objective of the ANU and especially of its Research School of Pacific Studies (the latter the brainchild of F. W. Eggleston), that is, to conduct research into topics of special relevance to Australia. With his recent experience as minister to the Chinese government, and his awareness of the importance of China, Copland was delighted with the appointment when Lindsay accepted a position in the new university. It should be noted that Copland found it necessary, during the appointment proceedings, to write to the Secretary of the Department of

---

3 Walter Crocker to Lindsay, 1 July 1949: Lindsay Papers.
4 Walter Crocker to Lindsay, 10 November 1949: Lindsay Papers.
5 Walter Crocker to Lindsay, 13 October 1950: Lindsay Papers.
Immigration to reassure the authorities that Lindsay was no security risk; he also sought in an earlier letter (marked ‘Personal’) to ensure that his wife, Hsiao Li, and the Lindsay children would receive the appropriate visas, the clear context of his enquiry being the White Australia Policy. Though with a reputation as a stout defender of restrictive immigration, in this instance the Secretary, Tasman Heyes, gave his assent.

On the circumstances of Lindsay’s appointment, the official history, which follows Crocker’s remarks in his 1991 oral history interview, is not entirely correct. Lindsay was certainly, in the 1940s and as a result of his direct personal experience (Lindsay 1944), sympathetic to the communist movement in China (a sympathy that was soon to dissipate, as will be shown) but it was not the case that ‘this effectively disqualified him for a university job in Britain’ (Foster and Varghese 1996: 108). His approach from Crocker regarding an appointment at the ANU came while he was a lecturer in economics at Hull University. Prior to his appointment at Hull he had been a visiting lecturer at Harvard University. With Crocker’s departure in 1952 Lindsay, holding the position of Senior Research Fellow (and as such still untenured) became acting head of the Department, a role he occupied (apart from periods on study leave) until November 1957. He became a tenured Senior Fellow (after the position had been advertised and other candidates considered) in 1954 and was promoted to Reader (again after advertisement) in 1959. He succeeded to the peerage created for his father in 1952.

Although the official history refers to the Department as having ‘troubled beginnings’, Lindsay’s record in laying the groundwork for the new Department while producing extensive work of his own is hard to fault. A measure of his success can be gauged in the talent he managed to attract to a university yet without adequate buildings or a proper research library. In addition to recruiting the first research students, including P. D. Marchant (1955), G. M. Kelly and A. C. Palfreeman (1956), Lindsay was also responsible for the early appointments to the Department. On Lindsay’s recommendation, Arthur Lee Burns became a Research Fellow in 1955 and approval was given to appoint George Modelski in 1956. Both were to make their mark on the discipline, Burns being the first Australian to publish in the pre-eminent American journal, *World Politics* (Burns 1957).

---

6 D. B. Copland to T. H. E. Heyes, 14 December 1950; 27 September 1950: ANUA 19, Box 9, File 6.2.2.8, Pt 1.
and Modelski later founding an entire sub-school of historical international relations, centring upon the impact of long range processes in global politics. Lindsay also supervised Richard Rosecrance, a visiting graduate student from Harvard, who extended his stay at the ANU with Fulbright funding and who published a major study of postwar Japan–Australia relations (Rosecrance 1962). Later at the University of California, at Cornell University and at Harvard, Rosecrance made a most distinguished contribution to international relations as one of America’s top scholars. As a result of their personal acquaintance, Lindsay hosted noted China scholar and psychological war specialist Paul Linebarger from Johns Hopkins University as a visiting professor in 1957.

In these years, Lindsay produced a steady stream of academic publications. While the Dean (Acting Dean, 1956, Dean 1957) of his Research School, Professor of Pacific History J. W. Davidson, with whom he had major disagreements, was often absent and proved very reluctant to publish on his specialty, Polynesian history (Munro 2000), Lindsay was one of the most productive of the School’s members. Even by the more stringent standards of recent times, Lindsay’s oeuvre is impressive. He published one book with Melbourne University Press (1955a) and took the completed manuscript of a second to the United States where it was published shortly after his arrival (1960a). In addition, having already published in The Journal of Politics and International Affairs his articles written in Canberra appeared in a string of learned journals: Political Quarterly, Japan Quarterly, International Journal, Public Administration, Journal of International Affairs, Australian Journal of Politics and History and Australian Outlook; he also contributed an invited review article to World Politics (Lindsay 1947b, 1947c, 1948, 1950a, 1951, 1955b, 1955c, 1955e, 1957a, 1957b, 1959a, 1959b). Though these publications occurred long before measures of academic esteem became fashionable, there were few of his peers in Australia who were writing work which generated this degree of international interest. Neither did members of his Research School often publish pieces in New Republic or Atlantic Monthly. Mindful of the particular characteristics of the Australian audience he also produced articles for local publications including Meanjin and Current Affairs Bulletin (Lindsay 1955d, 1956a). In 1953 he gave the G. E. Morrison lecture at the ANU—on ‘China and the West’—and in 1955 the Roy Milne lecture for the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA). The latter work, ‘Scientific Method and International Affairs’, later published by the
Institute, constitutes his most considered treatment of the philosophical and methodological foundations for international relations, and, as will be shown, explains much about his differences with Wight (Lindsay 1955f).

Beyond academia, and consistent with his strong belief in the need to foster public awareness of international affairs, Lindsay devoted considerable time to journalism and broadcasting. He wrote on topics including on the flaws in British policy during the Suez crisis (Sydney Morning Herald, 26 November 1956), on the unchanging essentials of Russian and Chinese global policy (Herald, 13 June 1956) and on the merits of admitting a quota of Asian immigrants (Weekly Times, 13 June 1956). Having had experience as a broadcaster on the third programme of the BBC, Lindsay delivered talks on the ABC ‘notes on the news’ series on subjects as diverse as ‘Chinese foreign policy’, ‘Korea truce talks’, ‘Yugoslavia’ and ‘Bandung’. He was also an energetic member of the AIIA, serving as President of the ACT branch in 1955–57. He also found time for service to Adult Education, lecturing in Adelaide, Perth and Hobart.

Outside the ANU, Lindsay was the familiar of many influential figures. He was consulted on China by Casey, and became acquainted with other Australian parliamentarians. Nor were his British links neglected. In 1954, as a result of an invitation from China, the British Labour Party decided to send a delegation to Beijing which was to be led by former Prime Minister Clement Attlee, then Leader of the Opposition. Lindsay and his wife Hsiao Li were asked to serve as interpreters for the visit, and the ANU gave permission for their absence. Lindsay discussed the trip with Senator (later Prime Minister) John Gorton, then Chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, who clearly saw some advantage in being able to obtain firsthand information on conditions in China. Following the visit, where Lindsay met many old friends and was also present at meetings with China’s senior leaders including Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, he spent September to November 1954 in India, Burma, Hong Kong and Japan. The last destination was added in order for Lindsay to attend, as an AIIA delegate, the biennial conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), held in Kyoto. Though buffeted by the adverse winds of the Cold War, the IPR was still the pre-eminent ‘track two’ diplomatic vehicle in the Asia Pacific. The process by which Lindsay’s attendance was approved by the

7 Typescripts of these and other similar items are found in the Lindsay Papers.
ANU gives some insight into the conditions under which he was working. The Chair of the AIIA Commonwealth Council, Tristan Buesst, wrote to the Vice-Chancellor pointing out the advantages of Lindsay’s attendance in Kyoto and seeking some support for the ANU to allow him to make a ‘notable contribution’, given that he and Lady Lindsay would then have been witness to meetings with China’s highest leadership. On this letter Sir Leslie Melville has penned the querulous lines, ‘What case is there for this and particularly for meeting Lady Lindsay’s fares? Are there any precedents? What are the views of the Dean?’ As no other person at the ANU had ever met or was ever likely to meet Mao Zedong, let alone already have made his acquaintance, precedents would have been few, Davidson’s well known intimacy with Samoan chiefs notwithstanding. Melville, unlike his predecessor, was not one of life’s enlargers.

LINDSAY, THE ANU AUTHORITIES AND THE WIGHT AFFAIR
Lindsay’s experience of the authorities at the ANU was not happy. Within a year of his appointment, Crocker had taken leave and Lindsay became acting head, discharging these responsibilities until 1958. However, his lack of senior status excluded him from decision-making circles. It is a notable fact that this new institution, established under a nationalist charter in what purported to be an egalitarian society, was hierarchic to a degree extraordinary for the time (although more in keeping with contemporary practice), despite the staff numbers being so modest that the entire complement could all have fitted into the tea room of the old Canberra Hospital (then the ANU’s accommodation). The controversies of 1957–59 can only be understood in this context. Crocker eventually resigned (having recommended Lindsay for promotion) and in November 1954 an Electoral Board was established to consider applications for a Chair. Lindsay, although departmental head, had not been consulted and was unaware of this development until it was announced at a Faculty meeting; he at once wrote to the Vice-Chancellor with his views regarding what research program would be appropriate to an expanded department, expressing the hope that his submission would contribute to the preparations for the Chair. The position he set out in his memorandum is discussed below. He was unaware and was not informed that the Electoral Board had already drafted the advertisement setting out the requirements

8 T. Buesst to Vice-Chancellor, 9 July 1954: ANUA 19, Box 9, File 6.2.2.8 Pt 1.
for the position. He was also misled by the Vice-Chancellor who responded to his memorandum with the statement, ‘I am very largely convinced by your argument’ and that there was consequently little to discuss. There would be many later episodes when Lindsay tried, in vain, to have his plans for the Department debated. Later, he complained that Melville was by aptitude an administrator who did not have the equipment to act decisively on the intellectual issues involved in running the ANU.

Lindsay duly applied for the Chair in April 1955. Though the relevant ANU files have apparently been destroyed (a puzzling fact, given that otherwise copious papers remain of the episode), the records that survive show, first, that in July 1955 the appointment committee deemed Lindsay ‘not of professorial standard’ and noted that he would no longer be considered. Second, it seems however that both the external assessors consulted by the Electoral Board (none of the Board members themselves being specialists in the relevant discipline) expressed dissent from this view. Third, the claim was advanced (it can be supposed, orally) that Lindsay was not fit for the position as he was not a competent administrator, yet Lindsay remained throughout this period as the Department’s acting head. Fourth, the Electoral Board nominated A. B. Cole, of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, as the appropriate appointee, although this decision (unusually) was later (on 30 September) rejected by the Board of Graduate Studies after somewhat anaemic testimonials became available. Fifth, despite the July decision (as set out in the minutes of the Electoral Board) Professor S. F. Nadel, then Dean of the Research School, on some accounts seems to have informed Lindsay on 5 September 1955 that he was second on the list of applicants, and that he would be offered the Chair if the first applicant was not appointed. This prompted a further memorandum from Lindsay giving his ideas on the program for the Department. Sixth, Nadel then informed Lindsay, on 14 October 1955, that he was not of professorial standard, but could expect a Readership. According to some accounts, Nadel’s tenure as Dean was marked by a ‘teutonic’ approach (Spate 2006: 26). While a first-rate anthropologist of Africa whose work is still held in

---

9  S. F. Nadel to Registrar, 29 November 1954: ANU Archives, File 6.5.4.0.  
10  Vice-Chancellor to Lindsay, 15 December 1954: ANU Archives, File 6.5.4.0.  
11  ‘Chronology of Events’: ANUA 8, Folder 3 (papers of R. D. Wright). See also ‘Memorandum on the Lindsay Manuscript’.
high regard, his attempts to construct a grand methodology for the social sciences applicable to the work of all of his colleagues were less successful. At this point Mark Oliphant (Director of the Research School of Physical Sciences) approached the Vice-Chancellor to ask him to act on Lindsay’s accumulating grievances, but Melville declined to do so. When Wight was later invited to assume the Chair, Lindsay’s trust in the fairness of ANU procedures had almost reached the point of no return.

Regarding the assessment of Cole, it should be noted that Lindsay was older than Cole, had certainly more varied experience and publications, and though he did not have Cole’s Chicago PhD he was evidently regarded particularly favourably by Professor Julius Stone, the ANU’s Australian-based external assessor whose work at that time influenced Lindsay (Stone 1954). To that point Cole’s publications were principally concerned with the international relations of Tokugawa Japan (he was later to publish on contemporary domestic Japanese politics). Lindsay’s extensive contributions to his discipline have been noted. It is a measure of the close interest taken in such appointments in official circles that the Vice-Chancellor asked External Affairs Minister Casey if any further information could be obtained about Cole. External Affairs Secretary Arthur Tange conveyed the message that the endorsement that had been communicated to Casey from Robert B. Stewart, Cole’s dean at the Fletcher School, was tepid.12 Casey also wrote to Ambassador Percy Spender seeking any information he could obtain.13 In the event the decision was taken not to proceed with the appointment. Then, in December 1956, came the offer to Wight.

In 1956, Wight was Reader in International Relations at the London School of Economics. He had recently accepted a visiting appointment at Chicago, and his celebrated lectures on the history of international thought were heard to acclaim in the US. Wight was offered the chair, though he had not been an applicant, through the offices of Hancock. As Lindsay wrote later to Hancock regarding the offer to Wight, ‘What really gave me a shock was to find out by chance that the offer had been made when I had been led to believe that the issue was in abeyance and that I was being given a chance to show what I could make of the Department.’ Once again he had

12 Arthur Tange to Vice-Chancellor, 27 September 1955: ANUA 8, Folder 5.
been denied the opportunity to state and defend his views regarding what the Department might do.14

Hancock had arrived in Canberra in March 1957, and having been acquainted with Lindsay’s father at Balliol College, the younger Lindsay (a fellow Balliol man) became one of his intimates. Very soon, the offer to Wight was a subject of their conversations. Having discussed Wight’s work and reputation with Hancock, Lindsay wrote to Wight to address two matters. He sought, first, to ensure that he could carry on his own work under Wight, a reasonable enough concern given that in that era professors in the research schools were heads and the sole determinants of the activities in their departments. Lindsay’s second concern was to argue for a particular approach to the subject, given the character and location of the ANU. He regarded ‘research with some relevance for the problems of Australian foreign policy’ as necessarily central to the work of the Department, and expressed his dismay that an appointment had been made which apparently ignored this priority in favour of purely historical studies with no particular connection with Australia.15 The methodological foundations for this second concern will be further examined below.

Wight’s response was initially reassuring. Lindsay could carry on his work—Wight was even sympathetic on the question of Lindsay’s promotion—and in any case his own approach to such matters was ‘laissez faire rather than Gleichschaltung’. But Wight disputed Lindsay’s methodological characterisation of the subject, finding his own position inclusive whereas he characterised Lindsay’s as prescriptive. However, in relation to plans then in train for the Department, Wight added the remark, consistent with the role at that time of the professoriate, that ‘future appointments … will no doubt reflect my interests or prejudices’. While he accepted that there was a rationale for much work ‘on problems relating to Australian foreign policy’ in the Department, he did not accept that such an agenda exhausted the work that should be pursued. His chief difference with Lindsay was in regard to his critique of ‘purely historical studies’. As Wight states:

14 Lindsay to W. K. Hancock, ‘Personal & confidential’, 15 September 1957: Lindsay Papers.
15 Lindsay to Martin Wight, 20 March 1957: Lindsay Papers.
I suppose International Relations to be an autonomous branch of political studies, with something to learn from its sister disciplines. In your [Roy Milne] lecture (which says a great number of things that I should like to have said myself) you emphasise the danger of concentrating on subjects without relevance to current social problems … I warmly endorse your preference for concrete practical studies over a sterile intellectual abstractionism—one sees a good deal of the latter at the L.S.E. But my experience has impressed me also with the difference between both the kinds of study you are discussing, on the one hand, and deeper or more long-term or more philosophical studies on the other. It is the old distinction between political science and political philosophy. It seems to me that in the social sciences, the study of immediate problems … has acquired a preponderance over deeper studies, and that this is not altogether healthy.16

Lindsay and Wight then exchanged further letters, Lindsay writing on 9 June to rehearse at length his argument that the particular conditions of the ANU, notably the ‘limited resources’ available to the small Department and the ‘marginal productivity’ such a unit was likely to make on work of a more general character, prescribed a focus on issues relevant to Australia and its region.17 He also restated his claim to promotion. Then, raising an issue that Wight later admitted caused him some concern, he advised Wight that he was to attend in the following month a meeting of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee and, given the uncertainties of the position, was still undecided as to whether he could inform the parliamentarians that he was in a position to continue to pursue his work within the ANU. Nevertheless, Lindsay made clear that he was largely reassured by the sentiments expressed in Wight’s letter.

Wight responded, indicating that he felt that he had yet to receive the same assurances he had extended to Lindsay.18 Lindsay’s response of 28 June was conciliatory and apologetic, and also offered the following positive observations on Wight’s work, Lindsay by this stage fully aware that its intended direction was not so much historical as theoretical:

I did not mean to give the impression that I would not respect the work you want to do. I do consider the basic questions of political philosophy to be

16 Martin Wight to Lindsay, 11 May 1957: Lindsay Papers.
17 Lindsay to Martin Wight, 9 June 1957: Lindsay Papers.
18 Martin Wight to Lindsay, 20 June 1957: Lindsay Papers.
extremely important and I have often said that a great deal of work on international relations has suffered from people not having thought enough on basic questions and, in consequence, working with presupposition [sic] which they have not thought out and were, therefore, confused and inconsistent.\textsuperscript{19}

He also informed Wight that a decision had been taken ‘to write off the unfortunate events of the past’, and that he was confident that Wight would not be drawn into controversy when he took up his position at the ANU. By this stage, however, Wight had formed the view that he would not find the ANU congenial, and withdrew from the position. The Vice-Chancellor was clearly furious, believing that Lindsay’s letters had served to ‘frighten’ Wight into withdrawal, and threatened disciplinary action; Lindsay wrote again to Wight to ask him whether he could refute the Vice-Chancellor’s conjecture.\textsuperscript{20} Wight’s response was magnanimous. He had hoped for ‘a kind of tranquil All Souls’ but instead he had learned that the ANU was beset with controversy and the focus of public interest. But he did not blame Lindsay for the denouement: ‘So did you frighten me off, or open my eyes? I shall never know the answer for sure, but I incline towards the second way of putting it; and feel gratitude towards you rather than the reverse.’\textsuperscript{21} Wight also stated that Lindsay was not the exclusive source of this information; he had also received information from ‘other sources’. And Wight had already written to Hancock, his principal source, with the following observation:

It seems to me that the accidents of the interregnum in the Chair and Lindsay’s own gifts, and the nature of Australian society, have combined to give the Department a direction which (from this distance) seems the proper direction for an A.N.U., and one where I have no role to play. For my part, I should rejoice if this little drama were to end by my reading that Lindsay himself had been appointed.\textsuperscript{22}

Hancock’s central role in the episode is confirmed by a long letter from Lindsay of 15 September in which the background to each of his letters to Wight is discussed, Hancock’s advice (along with that of Oliphant) clearly having been the most important influence upon their content.\textsuperscript{23} Even at this

\textsuperscript{19} Lindsay to Martin Wight, 28 June 1957: Lindsay Papers.
\textsuperscript{20} Lindsay to Martin Wight, 16 August 1957: Lindsay Papers.
\textsuperscript{21} Martin Wight to Lindsay, 21 August 1957: Lindsay Papers.
\textsuperscript{22} Martin Wight to W. K. Hancock, 9 August 1957: ANUA 8, Folder 1.
\textsuperscript{23} Lindsay to W. K. Hancock, ‘Personal & confidential’, 15 September 1957: Lindsay Papers.
point Lindsay was evidently ignorant of Hancock’s correspondence with Wight, but his position is nevertheless captured in his statement, ‘The whole business confirms my view that the operational slogan of the ANU is the Chinese proverb, “Officials are allowed to start a fire but the common people may not light a lamp”.’

In the section of the work devoted to the arrival and impact of Hancock, the ANU official history provides further detail of the Lindsay episode. It maintains that, learning of Lindsay’s concern with Wight’s appointment, ‘Hancock encouraged him to write to Wight setting out his concerns. Lindsay took the advice and wrote the letter which convinced Wight that he would do better to remain in London’ (Foster and Varghese 1996: 132). The official history thus similarly confirms Hancock’s central role. When Hancock first arrived he spent some time reviewing the history of Lindsay’s relations with the ANU and seems to have been sympathetic to his predicament. In a personal letter to Wight in June 1957, Hancock stated the view that Lindsay has been mishandled in the past ... Lindsay should have been given a Readership when it became clear that he would be in charge of the Department during a quite long interregnum ... I have not read much of his work but it seems to me to be sufficiently good and there has been quite a lot of it. I also think he has done his duty to his students and the community and managed his Department reasonably well.24

These problems have arisen as a result of ‘faults that have existed within the School of Pacific Studies’, though these are presently being remedied. Despite subsequent events, Hancock retained a high opinion of Lindsay’s capabilities. In 1959, in a letter in relation to a possible appointment in Melbourne, Hancock writes of Lindsay that ‘he has an interesting and quite powerful mind’ and that many of his troubles are the result of a predicament not of his own making: ‘No doubt he is more of a person than most people here, and the people who controlled his destinies are, many of them, smaller men than he.’25 And in an overview of the entire affair written in July 1959 and sent to the Vice-Chancellor, Hancock, having given a highly critical account of the early history of the Research

24  W. K. Hancock to Martin Wight, 7 June 1957: ANUA 8, Folder 1.
School of Pacific Studies, ascribes much of Lindsay’s troubles to the School’s ‘muddle and faction’.\textsuperscript{26}

In Hancock’s autobiographical book \textit{Professing History}, there is an elliptical passage which refers to his unsuccessful attempts, while Director of the Research School of Social Sciences (RSSS), ‘to provide therapy which two troubled persons needed’ (Hancock 1976: 38). It is certainly the case that the materials now held in the ANU archives thoroughly document the major role Hancock played in Lindsay’s travails. Hancock’s various notes to Lindsay advise caution, conciliation and patience, and the unhappy denouement Hancock ascribes in his personal letters to the fact that Lindsay was ill. But if these materials are considered together with the full correspondence between Wight and Lindsay, a somewhat less benign construction can be placed on this episode. Unbeknown to Lindsay, Hancock was also conducting his correspondence with Wight, which contains quite calculated advice on what line Wight should take in his letters to Lindsay. Hancock had a considerable role in the decision to offer the chair to his friend Wight, who from London had been advising the new university on possible candidates for positions prior to this episode. Hancock was coaching both sides, though concealing his role from one of the parties, and therefore he cannot but be closely associated with the outcome. In the various accounts he gave of his decision to withdraw from the chair, Wight adverts to information he received from ‘other sources’ about the ANU which influenced his decision. His most considerable source was Hancock, and Hancock indeed had some critical remarks to offer on the early organisation of the ANU. In his July 1959 overview, Hancock stated that he is now so conversant with the Lindsay affair that ‘I should now be able ... to write an account of what has occurred that would be as close to the truth as (say) one of my war histories’.\textsuperscript{27} However, although admitted to the secrets of the Cabinet Office, Hancock was in no sense a maker of policy during the war, but his actions in this episode were central. Those reservations that some of his colleagues expressed on Davidson’s ability to analyse the history of Samoa while simultaneously shaping it might be applied equally to Hancock. In the end, Lindsay’s sobriquet for Hancock, ‘Sir Fox’, was somewhat apt.

\textsuperscript{26} W. K. Hancock, ‘Secret. Lord Lindsay’s Trouble’, 12 July 1959: ANUA8, Folder 4.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Ibid.}
In the aftermath of the Wight affair, the ANU then offered the chair again to Crocker, who declined. A personal letter to his old friend Crocker from Hancock demonstrates once again that Hancock was orchestrating the appointment procedure. Various arrangements were then considered for the Department, Davidson expressing a preference for its amalgamation with Pacific History, and Hancock its transferring to his own Research School. Though Lindsay argued for retaining the existing administrative structure, in November 1957 the decision was taken by the Board of Graduate Studies that for at least a period of one year the Department of International Relations would remain in its current location and with its existing personnel, but Professor Leicester Webb (from Political Science in RSSS) would serve as acting head. Webb had conducted some of his studies at Geneva in international relations and was therefore acquainted with the subject, a fact noted by Lindsay as a positive element in this outcome. However, while in Japan on study leave in 1958 Lindsay was informed by letter that the University Council had amalgamated his Department with the Department of Political Science in the neighbouring Research School of Social Sciences and that he had passed under the continuing authority of Webb. Within three years a new appointment to the chair would be made. The Department would then be subject to the direction of the new chair as to research priorities, and the location or re-location of the Department would then be reviewed. Once again, it seemed, Lindsay was the subject of arbitrary administrative decisions.

Even his absence on study leave generated a further bureaucratic tangle. After fieldwork in Asia, Lindsay had spent a semester at Yale University as a visiting professor. While at Yale he had been invited by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik to deliver a lecture in Germany as a contributor to a prestigious series, the other speakers nominated being Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Hugh Gaitskell and Raymond Aron. The German foreign ministry also sought to arrange consultations with Lindsay during his visit. The period in which he was due to travel to Germany fell in the ANU summer vacation and Lindsay had assumed that he was free to make the trip; he had corresponded informally with colleagues at the ANU on the invitation, including his nominal head of school, Webb. But,

28 W. K. Hancock to Walter Crocker, 3 August 1957: ANUA 8, Folder 1.
29 Registrar to Lindsay, 23 July 1958: ANUA 19, Box 9, File 6.2.2.8, Pt 2.
considering how he spent the summer break was his own responsibility, he had not filed an official application for absence and was duly reprimanded. In the flurry of paper that ensued, Davidson, whose absences in the South Pacific advising island statesmen were later to become legendary, minuted, ‘are there any special reasons why this should be approved?’ 

Upon his return, Lindsay was subject to a stern interview with the Vice-Chancellor, the record of which makes no mention of his discussions with world statesmen. As Lindsay was later to complain to journalist Alan Reid regarding his treatment:

As soon as I get outside the ANU, in Taiwan, Japan, the U.S.A., the U.K., Germany or India (places where I was on study leave) I am treated as a distinguished expert in my fields of interest. In Japan [Prime Minister] Yoshida asked to see me and questioned me for nearly two hours on the China situation. In America Yale appoints me Visiting Professor; places like Harvard, Columbia and Cornell ask me for public lectures or talks to staff seminars; the Canadian National War College asks for me in a series for which they try to get the best people in each field. In the U.K. I am asked to talk at Chatham House or to seminars at St. Anthony’s. In Germany, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik pays me DM500 for a lecture and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung prints a full page report of it. In Delhi [Prime Minister] Nehru asks me to lunch to question me about China. And so on. When I get back to Canberra the ANU says, in effect, “If you behave properly and produce good work over the next two years we will consider the possibility that you deserve the same status as our existing professors and may offer you conditions under which you can develop your work here.”

This view was echoed in Hancock’s arch remark to J. A. La Nauze (another Balliol man) of the situation he encountered in 1957: ‘Lindsay seemed to hold a position below the level of his reputation outside Australia, whereas the reverse was possibly true for one or two of his colleagues.’

Nonetheless, after advertisement, Lindsay was eventually promoted to Reader in May 1959. His much anticipated promotion is revealing of his standing in the discipline at that time. When the filling of the readership was

---

30 W. K. Hancock to Dean, 5 January 1959: ANUA 19, Box 9, File 6.2.2.8, Pt 2.
31 ‘Discussion with Lord Lindsay on 11 March 1959’: ANUA 19, Box 9, File 6.2.2.8, Pt 2.
32 Lindsay to [Alan] Reid, 10 July 1959: Lindsay Papers.
33 W. K. Hancock to J. A. La Nauze, 18 May 1959: ANUA 8, Folder 4.
considered, the ANU chose to consult external assessors. Hancock contacted Wight, though there is no record of his response. As Lindsay was advised that it was unnecessary for him to make a formal application, Hancock, at Lindsay’s request, sought opinion from leading scholars in the US in order to inform the appointment committee of his relative standing in the discipline. George Taylor at the University of Washington, Seattle, described Lindsay as ‘one of the most able and well-equipped scholars in the field of international affairs’. Similar sentiments were expressed by Robert Strausz-Hupé at Pennsylvania, and Karl Wittfogel, Taylor’s colleague, wrote that ‘Australia is fortunate to have such a China expert’. Meanwhile, Professor W. Y. Elliott, eminent Harvard historian, intimate of US presidents and former scholar with Hancock at Balliol, had written on his own initiative to Hancock about Lindsay. Having recently hosted him during a visit to Cambridge and having known him for many years, Elliott had learned something of Lindsay’s difficulties and offered the testimony that ‘he is really as impressive an example of intellectual ability and a high sense of scholarly integrity as anyone I have run into in a long time. Having impressed at Yale and Harvard, a good position could be found for him in the United States but it is clear that he is committed to his work in Australia’. Thus prompted, Hancock asked Elliott to be the second assessor for the readership. In response, Elliott expressed the view that a professorship for Lindsay should not be long delayed. Of his standing in his subject, Elliott stated the opinion that ‘Michael is much better in his assessment of political problems ... than any of the professors of this kind of Chinese politics that we have in the United States’. Elliott’s previous letter mentions J. K. Fairbank as belonging in this company. Once again, out of the context of his own institution, Lindsay’s standing was confirmed.

Having failed to clarify, to his own satisfaction, what prospects he might have for the chair when it was eventually filled, Lindsay accepted a position at American University, Washington DC, as Professor of Far Eastern Studies and Dean of the School of International Service. As a parting shot, he gave a number of interviews to journalists and appeared on television to

---

34 George Taylor to W. K. Hancock, 11 February 1959: ANUA 8, Folder 4.
35 Karl Wittfogel to W. K. Hancock, 9 February 1959: ANUA 8, Folder 4.
37 William Yandell Elliott to W. K. Hancock, 3 December 1958: ANUA 8, Folder 4.
publicise what he considered to be the excessive bureaucratisation of the ANU and the arbitrary actions of those in authority. He also published a two-part account of his criticisms in the Sydney Observer. The first of these pieces rehearses some of his experiences; the second offers a considered view of his discipline and the unsatisfactory way it had been accommodated in the new university. International relations, on Lindsay’s view, lacked a unified ‘body of general theory’. Given that the place of graduate study was still a matter of debate at the new university, Lindsay argued that there were difficulties in the way of teaching international relations as a subject in itself, and that it would be better presented as a part of a wider course in Political Science or History. On the other hand, as a subject for research, the discipline offered insights into many practical problems, and Australia stood in need of work on such problems. Given the lack of resources and the consequent need to choose carefully from the possible range of research programs, the ANU should exploit its ‘comparative advantage’ in studies of contemporary Asia, and also in ‘mainly theoretical’ studies, the latter informed by the techniques of Operations Research. On the other hand, without an appropriately equipped library, historical studies of international relations could not profitably be pursued. The excessive scholasticism of some social scientific work at the University neglected the social responsibility of the scholar and should be avoided: ‘Australia ... badly needs intellectuals with a sense of responsibility towards society doing fundamental research on problems important to Australia and disseminating their knowledge to help in producing an informed public opinion’ (Lindsay 1959c).

In the event, Lindsay became obsessed with his treatment at the ANU, and nothing less than the censure of the Vice-Chancellor and the Dean of the Research School of Pacific Studies would have mollified him. After his departure he submitted a long manuscript, ‘A Study in Academic Standards’ to the ANU, and offered the authorities the opportunity to address its charges.38 Under a new Vice-Chancellor, an inquiry was held, but as its findings made no fundamental criticisms of personnel or procedures and as the report embodying those findings remained confidential, Lindsay was unsatisfied with the outcome. An attempt to publish the manuscript as a book in Australia was not successful, but the legacy of these departing

38 ‘Lindsay Report’: ANUA 8, Folder 2.
manoeuvres was to further obscure Lindsay’s arguments regarding the proper place and scope of his discipline with issues of power and personality. These views have already been outlined; they will now be considered in greater detail, first by way of their origins in Lindsay’s scholarship on China.

**LINDSAY ON THE COMMUNIST REGIME IN CHINA**

There can be little doubt that Lindsay’s experience in China was formative. His years with the guerrillas in the mountains of Shanxi and in Yanan had given him a better insight into the fundamentals of the Chinese movement than perhaps any other foreign commentator. His arrival at the ANU and his assumption of responsibility for a program in international relations coincided with the onset of the Cold War and with the transformation of that movement into a ruling regime. The apparently uncritical alignment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) with the Soviet Union posed many puzzles for Lindsay, both regarding developments inside China and especially in relation to the activities of people in the leadership he knew well, and also in connection with the foreign policy likely to be pursued in the longer term by such a regime. In turn, contemplation of the latter raised the most fundamental issues of peace and war in the international system.

In 1947, Lindsay was confident that the Communist forces, while poorly armed and less numerous, would most likely win the conflict with the Kuomintang unless the United States was prepared to extend very large amounts of aid to Chiang Kai-shek for an almost indefinite period. Though vastly inferior in arms and equipment, and without a munificent foreign sponsor, they had the advantage of being the arm of a credible political cause:

> The Communist army was of necessity almost as much a political as a military organization. It had to make its men politically conscious because an army that fights in small scattered units cannot be kept together by discipline imposed from above. A man who does not know what he is fighting for is seldom of much use as a guerrilla. The Communist army was also entirely dependent on popular support (Lindsay 1947a: 198).

In this analysis he relied upon his own observations of the Communist capacity to wage mobile warfare while retaining the allegiance of the population.
Lindsay and Hsiao Li visited China for six weeks in 1949, writing for *The New Statesman*. Lindsay was impressed by reports of the pragmatism of the communist government; he was also convinced that in North China at least the Kuomintang had been completely discredited. Even at that time, however, he was evidently struck by a new dynamic inside the communist movement. On the one hand, the popularly based and problem-solving approach which was familiar to him from his experience was evident, but there was also the appearance of a fundamentalist strain which suggested a separate path of development might be possible.

Our strong impression was that ... two tendencies of which people in the party were not fully conscious, would obviously be of fundamental importance in determining the direction of future developments. If the scientific attitude of mind predominates, then the new China will probably be a society of which most democratic opinion would approve. If the doctrinaire attitude predominates, it might degenerate very badly; and ... the doctrinaire attitude is now rather stronger than it was in 1945 (Lindsay 1950a: 26).

Lindsay published at greater length his impressions of the People’s Republic in *New China: Three Views* (1950b). He discussed extensively the issue of dogmatism, which he contrasted with the position expressed in the slogan used by Mao and to be seen in wall posters which he translated as ‘from facts get reality’ (*shishi qiushi*—‘seek truth from facts’). It is no accident that, after 1978, this apothegm was pragmatist Deng Xiaoping’s favourite quotation from Mao. As against such an apparently pragmatic conception of the regime’s theoretical standpoint, there was making its appearance an ideological fundamentalism derived apparently from Stalin. Which approach would triumph would have the greatest consequence:

China faces a choice between two roads of development; the one, based on the “scientific” interpretation of Marxism, towards a form of Communism which would really serve the people and could become fully democratic; the other, based on the “doctrinaire” interpretation, along the Russian road of degeneration towards “oligarchical collectivism” which could produce something like the traditional Chinese social structure but with Marxian instead of Confucian orthodoxy as the ideology of the ruling bureaucracy. Both tendencies exist and the British people have every reason for wishing the former to prevail (Lindsay 1950b: 149–50).

This contest was likely to have a very significant impact on foreign relations. Writing before the outbreak of the Korean War, Lindsay argued that given its origins, the new regime was largely ignorant of the conventions of diplomacy and likely to see any external issues in terms of
programmatic principles. For its part, while Britain recognised the new government, whatever advantages might have been derived from that recognition had so far been squandered by hostile statements of disapproval of communism. Such statements allowed the doctrinaires within the leadership, who in any case had no use for diplomacy, to advance the theory of the inevitable clash between the socialist bloc and capitalism. Yet, if the British government could abandon its implacably anti-Communist stance, a way could be found to conduct relations. The key was to ‘reduce the basic disagreement between Britain and China from a fundamental conflict of principle to a dispute about facts’, namely, ‘the truth or falsity of the claims of various Communist parties to represent the masses’ (Lindsay 1950b: 148). Beginning with China, British policy should be framed so as to test Communist claims of popular approval and support. So far, however, ‘the British authorities have done almost nothing to encourage the democratic forces in China but, by both action and inaction, have done a good deal to strengthen the worst “doctrinaire” tendencies in Chinese Communism.’ (Lindsay 1950b: 150)

Lindsay’s proposals for viable Sino-British relations could not be sustained in the atmosphere generated by the Korean War. Nevertheless, what can be seen here is the germ of Lindsay’s intellectual project during his time in Australia and beyond.

Serving (with Hsiao Li, as has been noted), as official translator to the British Labour Party delegation, Lindsay revisited China in 1954. This experience led him to modify and refine his views, especially in regard to the issue of coexistence, that issue which was the central focus of *China and the Cold War* (1955a). The question which preoccupied both sides during the 1954 visit was the issue of peace. The Geneva agreements on Indochina and Korea appeared to portend a new era of cooperation and coexistence, yet there still seemed many obstacles to a mutuality of view. Despite the opportunity presented by the presence of the former British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary in Beijing, Lindsay was struck by the reluctance of the Chinese side to address the fundamentals of bilateral relations:

During the seventeen days of the British Labour Party delegation’s stay in China less than twelve hours were spent in discussions of the international situation or Sino-British relations. This low priority accorded to serious discussion is psychologically understandable because continued discussion would have brought into the open various awkward questions about Chinese policy which are normally left unasked (Lindsay 1955c: 85).
This observation provoked a further analysis of the new regime. Such behaviour could be ascribed to a desire by that regime to monopolise power irrespective of the circumstances, a view which had many adherents in the West. But Lindsay’s direct experience suggested that the answer was much more complex: ‘from my own personal experience it seems to me very unlikely that the Chinese Communists whom I knew and respected in the period from 1938 to 1945 should have degenerated into power seeking megalomaniacs’ (Lindsay 1955a: 74). While mindful of the potential for all pervasive intellectual control in communist polities, a view he derived in part from a reading of Milosz (1953), Lindsay did not believe that the current Chinese system was monolithic.

It was incorrect to assume that the Chinese system was unified; behind the facade of communist slogans there was clearly evidence of differing points of view. Lindsay instances the conciliatory statements that accompanied Chinese diplomacy at Geneva with the campaign which was orchestrated against the occupation of Taiwan shortly thereafter. He drew the conclusion that although there were some amongst the leadership who were prepared to accept and propagate whatever theory served the ends of power, there were clearly ‘intelligent people in responsible positions’ for whom the inherently ‘irrational’ worldview of Marxism–Leninism held sway as a result of a lack of comprehensive information (Lindsay 1955c: 81–2). Lindsay pointed out that there was a rich empirical tradition in the Chinese Communist Party: Mao’s own early advocacy of a peasant based revolutionary strategy earned him the censure of the COMINTERN, and even in more recent times Mao expressed ‘a plea for an objective scientific spirit in study’ (Lindsay 1955a: 119). If an appeal could be made to this empirical tradition, significant consequences might follow:

The strategy most likely, in the long run, to reduce the risk of war would aim at raising issues in a form which would force the Chinese leadership to face the questions they at present evade, in the hope that when it comes to the point they will give priority to peace. It would also aim at producing situations in which groups in the Chinese leadership which did in fact give the highest priority to peace would be able to get results which would enhance their prestige and authority as against their more doctrinaire opponents (Lindsay 1955c: 88).

Provided the truly fanatical were a minority in the Communist movement, a position Lindsay was inclined to accept, clear advantages had to be offered to a China prepared, by its conduct, to pursue peaceful
coexistence. To be sure, official Western attitudes required severe modification for this approach to have any chance of success. American policy had an unfortunate historical legacy which would be difficult to jettison (Lindsay 1947b). Regarding that issue of greatest moment at the time he was writing, Formosa, in order to convince the Chinese regime of their peaceful intentions the United States and its allies would have to implement a genuine ‘neutralization’ of the island, ceasing to back the Kuomintang as the national government and refusing to support its military activities on the China coast. Elections under UN auspices should be encouraged. Admission to the UN and relaxation of the trade embargo could be offered if China agreed to deal in a peaceful manner with the authorities thus constituted.

Nor should non-communist countries obstruct any attempts to debate the issue of peace with the Chinese Communists, since such a process could supply that new information that might help those of the non-dogmatic school in the regime challenge the views of the fundamentalists. If the latter avoided engagement on contentious issues, the inadequacies of their position would be exposed. As he says in connection with the fear in Australia of becoming involved in any international exchange regarding the White Australia Policy, avoidance of debate ‘is evidence of a belief that the policy could not be defended in any discussion’ (Lindsay 1955a: 203). On Lindsay’s account, the project that became China and the Cold War began as a communication, prepared with two colleagues at the ANU, which Australian delegates to the Preliminary Conference for the forthcoming Peking Peace Conference (due to be held in October 1952) would take to the organisers (Lindsay 1955a: 159–61). The evasions expressed in the response, written by Rewi Alley, long-time China resident and supporter of the new government (Brady 2002: 69–70), indicated that the issue of the motivations of the communists required closer analysis. Such evasions were an indication that either the communists were not acting in good faith, or were not acting rationally. Lindsay cited the example of the visit by a Chinese friendship delegation led by Liu Ningyi (Liu Ning-i) to Britain in 1950. The delegation had many invitations which demonstrated a surprising degree of goodwill towards a new communist regime, but the Chinese chose to refuse most of them and instead permitted their activities to be managed by the Britain–China Friendship Association, which was effectively an arm of the British Communist movement. At the one meeting that was eventually held where some members of the British government
were present, Liu delivered a set-piece speech denouncing British policy, a strategy that could have no positive outcome in diplomacy or bilateral friendship. Lindsay was unable to decide what explained this conduct until he was able to place his critical account of it in the hands of Liu himself, by way of the visit to Beijing of Australian peace delegates, one of them being former External Affairs Secretary Dr John Burton, in May 1952. Liu's response was to profess annoyance:

[H]e had made up his mind before coming to England as to the kind of people he wanted to meet there. This is exactly the point at issue. Liu Ning-i apparently accepted the accounts of British conditions given by Soviet propaganda and the British Communists and refused to make any attempts to test by his own direct observation whether these accounts were accurate. It was also very revealing of Dr. John Burton's position that he appeared to accept this explanation from Liu Ning-i as entirely satisfactory (Lindsay 1955a: 15).

Liu was avoiding placing himself in a position where he would have to engage in a real exchange of opinion or discovery of new information. The plan of the book therefore unfolded. It was vital to take every opportunity to engage with the communist side to challenge their positions. It was equally necessary to ensure that those who did the engaging were neither sympathisers nor the woolly-minded. The 1952 conference was just such an opportunity but it was squandered when officials placed obstacles in the path of those wishing to attend (Deery and McLean 2003), the result instead being an own goal. Lindsay complained that ‘the Australian government was manoeuvred into using the totalitarian device of refusing passports to its citizens and acting in a way which Communist propaganda could plausibly represent as a warmongering capitalist government refusing to allow even the discussion of peace’ (Lindsay 1955a: 160). At the time, he criticised the government for its short-sighted strategy, was rebuked by Casey and responded with a vigorous press release which maintained that ‘[t]he ability of the communists to fool people by “peace” propaganda has depended very largely on their being allowed to operate without meeting any competition.’

39 ‘Lord Lindsay of Birker in reply to the Minister of External Affairs, Mr Casey – 23/6/52 – general press release’: NAA, A1838/266, 563/5/1 PART 1, Peking Conference.
In due course, Lindsay began work in Canberra on a further study of the possibilities and limits of coexistence. The urgency of such work was underlined by the existence of nuclear weapons which had given rise to a situation where neglect or quarantine was not a safe or prudent policy in dealing with dangerous regimes:

[The increase in human powers has brought with it an increase in responsibilities which many people are still reluctant to face. It was possible to tolerate wars so long as they only involved disaster for limited sections of the world. Now that a major war with atomic weapons might involve the complete elimination of human life, it is no longer possible to allow any country to “experiment in government by the insane” as several countries have done in the past (Lindsay 1955b: 8).

And the comparison between the recent histories of China and Japan provided a good indication of the extent to which external policy could be distorted by adherence to irrational belief systems. China was slow to respond to the challenge of the West precisely because its ruling strata were in thrall to an official ideology and enmeshed in a social structure with ‘some of the features now found in totalitarian societies’ (Lindsay 1955b: 9).

Revealing the influence of Karl Wittfogel (1957) at this stage in the evolution of his thinking, Lindsay had come to accept the proposition that there were some parallels between the pre-revolutionary and the contemporary political systems. Thus he maintained that “the Stalinist type of Communism is towards what Marx called “Oriental society”, a society in which the power of the ruling group depends, not on property, but on control of the apparatus of government” (Lindsay 1957b: 44).

In the later 1950s, the issue of coexistence was Lindsay’s chief intellectual preoccupation. The obstacles to overcome if peaceful coexistence was to be achieved were considerable:

In terms of rational self-interest the case for peaceful coexistence is overwhelming. It can, however, only be realized if both parties are ready to make changes in their system which would enable it to accept peaceful coexistence; and there are powerful vested interests operating against those necessary changes. The major obstacle to peaceful coexistence is the confused thinking which makes people want peace but refuse to face the price they may have to pay to get it. The neutral powers could play an extremely important role in overcoming this obstacle. So far they have failed to do so because their position has also been extremely confused (Lindsay 1956a: 60).
This approach implied a policy of exposing those vested interests on all sides, and also engaging with the non-aligned powers. Neither policy was especially favoured in Australia at that time.

Writing a little later on the policies of the Chinese government at the invitation of friends at Columbia University, Lindsay noted its mixture of motivations, nationalist and communist objectives sometimes to the fore, but at other times a form of ‘rational self-interest’ being in evidence (Lindsay 1957a: 145). Because these motivations were both mixed and inconsistent, and in particular given the fact that those close to the leadership who were best informed of conditions outside the country were fearful of proposing any policy, however realistic and advantageous, that might be thought to challenge communist dogma, framing policy towards Beijing must recognise this confusion. The policy likely to be most effective was that which made clear the advantages that would follow from abandoning doctrinaire objectives (Lindsay 1956b). China needed a period of peace for reconstruction, and openings to countries outside the Soviet bloc for trade. Informed by his Australian perspective, Lindsay suggested that if the SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) countries were less confrontational, demanding of China actions the new government could not accept, and instead made clear the benefits that would follow from a relaxation of tensions, there was a chance that rational self-interest would come to be more prominent and those with a good knowledge of external conditions might play a greater role. The clear inference to be drawn was that diplomatic recognition of the PRC should be on the agenda.

Lindsay’s work on China and coexistence was of central importance to Australia. In the past, Australian policy was hardly distinct from that of Britain; now it could be said, on his view, that the country had formed ‘an independent policy towards Asia’ (Lindsay 1957b: 34). Australia now had a very considerable stake in seeking to improve and stabilise regional order:

Twenty years ago Australia hardly needed to have a policy towards Asia because no Asian country except Japan was strong enough to be any threat to Australian security. In the future the power of Asian countries is certain to grow and long-run Australian security can only depend on establishing good relationships with them (Lindsay 1957b: 37).

While Australia’s current close alignment with the United States was based on evident security calculations, this alignment should not have been unquestioned or necessarily complete. In particular, Washington’s ‘dogmatic’ approach to Communism ‘gives American policy an inflexibility
from which Australia could well dissociate itself’, a recommendation that applies especially to the approach taken towards China (Lindsay 1957b: 40, 41). Noting the ‘emotional’ content of American policy towards China, Lindsay critiqued the intractable line taken by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles during his visit to Australia in 1957:

Mr. Dulles assumed that no possible gains could come from closer contact with China. But the possibility of contacts exerting some influence in China though it may be small is not negligible. The possibility of China becoming less hostile to the West through some change within the Communist régime is a great deal more likely than the possibility of a new revolution restoring the Kuomintang. The continued hostility implied by non-recognition only encourages the more extreme and doctrinaire forces within Chinese Communism and it is not sensible to lessen the chances of a more likely favourable development in order to increase the chances of an extremely unlikely one (Lindsay 1957b: 41).

This position is largely accepted today, but was a bold contention to state in the context of the 1950s.

In the longer term, Lindsay argued, Australia should aim to facilitate and encourage the kinds of social reforms that would undermine the appeals of communism, while seeking to counter the argument that free institutions were of no relevance to the poorer and more populous countries of Asia. The ability to act according to this prescription in the region could only be possible on the basis of a deeper knowledge than was currently available, and thus research with these practical results in view should be conducted. Lindsay inserted an observation on the apparent and regrettable preference at the ANU for ‘more purely academic work’ (Lindsay 1957b: 42). These remarks anticipated the later strategy of the J. G. Crawford era at the ANU, in which Lindsay, unfortunately, did not participate.

After his removal to the United States, Lindsay continued work on China. He produced some historical studies (Lindsay 1970) though his writing was principally focused on the increasing dominance of irrationalist Marxist ideology upon the regime’s policies (Lindsay 1960b, 1961, 1969) and the consequent difficulties of crafting a productive American bilateral relationship (Lindsay 1962, 1974, 1977, 1978).

There was thus a unity in Lindsay’s intellectual preoccupations in the 1950s. Given the existence of atomic weapons and in view of the instability of a power balance composed of just two power blocs, managing relations
with the Communist countries was the crucial international task. Confrontation was not a viable long-term policy (given the inherent instabilities in a balance of power arrangement, a point discussed below), and a more positive approach required a close study of communist motivations. This study suggested that the predominant United States’ view was inflexible, so Australia should not be satisfied simply to follow Washington’s lead. For Australia and its region the most important communist power was China, and framing policy so as to encourage, where possible, the forces within China favourable to peaceful coexistence was the logical path. At the same time, attention should be paid to the countries of Southeast Asia in order to assist in defusing the appeals of communism while encouraging their own contribution to building the conditions that would facilitate coexistence. Work on all these practical issues, though it could only be rooted in fundamental research, was vital if Australia was to be equipped to come to terms with a post-colonial Asia. A national priority should be placed, in international relations research, on the study of such issues. And the most sensible location for that study was the ANU. For the formation of this worldview and work program, Lindsay’s evolving ideas on China were crucial.

THE METHODOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Between December 1954 and 1957, Lindsay wrote four papers reviewing the condition of international relations as an academic discipline, advancing an argument for a particular methodological approach to the subject, and offering proposals for a program of work thus informed to be conducted at the ANU. While each of the papers was a response to a particular development at the ANU, they all embodied a unified view of the discipline. To Lindsay’s immense frustration, although he repeatedly sought a debate on the direction his Department should be taking, none was ever forthcoming; rather, its direction became the product of administrative fiat. As Lindsay observed of a discussion he held on his views with the Vice-Chancellor in December 1956, if his ideas were found to be ‘good’ but those advanced by others were regarded as ‘equally good’, then ‘the Vice-Chancellor seemed to be refusing to admit that the
principle of contradiction could have any relevance to questions of university policy’.  

Lindsay’s methodological position had already been set out in an appendix to China and the Cold War (1955a: 263–72). Here Lindsay defended a view of scientific truth which maintained that it was both objective but uncertain. Acknowledging a debt to the early work of Karl Popper (1945) and to some of the authorities from whom Popper drew his ideas, Lindsay contrasted this view with the proclaimed ‘certainty’ of Marxist and Thomist positions. Scientific knowledge is objective in the sense that it is the product of attempts to verify its hypotheses through experiment, but uncertain in the sense that further information might cause those hypotheses to be abandoned. Although subsequent defenders and expositors of the Popperian view would prefer to understand the crucial process as ‘non-falsification’ rather than ‘verification’, this argument is still a recognisable position in the philosophy of science.

Having stated the critical rationalist position, Lindsay likened the current state of knowledge to a jig-saw puzzle, ‘in which the pieces are items of empirical evidence and the picture on the puzzle a theoretical system of the world’ (Lindsay 1955a: 264). Various arrangements were possible and could only be firmly established once significant parts of the whole could be assembled; some pieces may actually turn out not to belong, being inaccuracies or deliberate falsehoods. A mere collection of empirical data was not thus likely to advance knowledge, a strategy which could be compared to collecting pieces without regard to their mutual fit. The guide of a ‘theoretical hypothesis’ was required. Scientific knowledge thus acquired is only ever provisional, and this provisional status is perhaps greater in the social as compared to the natural sciences:

It will often be true that scientific judgement can only say that, on the available evidence, several hypotheses are equally reasonable. And such cases are likely to be more frequent and the range of uncertainty is likely to be greater in the field of social science than in the field of natural science. This is because the number of relevant variables is usually larger, because the variables are often not susceptible of exact measurement and because it is seldom possible to make controlled experiments (Lindsay 1955a: 267).

---

40 Michael Lindsay, ‘A Study in Academic Standards. International Relations at the Australian National University’, ANU Archives, ANUA 8, Box 1, p. 70.
This uncertainty should not be confused for absence of objectivity. This process may support competing hypotheses, but would rule out many less reasonable propositions.

As a further guide to his methodological position, *China and the Cold War* also contains a critique of the most influential British exponent, in Lindsay’s time and currently, of the realist position, E. H. Carr (Lindsay 1955a: 127–30). The key proposition in Carr’s theory was the contention that states acted to pursue their respective interests and that these interests were generally in conflict. The realist prescription for avoidance of war rested upon the negotiation of a compromise, as to conflicting interests, which corresponded with the prevailing balance of power. Such a prescription, however, rests upon other sometimes unstated conditions. To recognise and act according to the balance, state actors needed to have accurate knowledge not only of their own powers and limitations but also the powers and limitations of other states. Further, they must act according to the canons of rationality. Such a system could not accommodate actors who sought to advance potentially unlimited interests (and here Lindsay had in mind Hitler and Stalin), nor was it possible without a degree of trust between the actors. Some or all of these conditions may have been absent and thus the balance precarious and unstable; in current conditions, the expectation that other parties would keep their agreements was low. Interestingly, Lindsay located the first depiction of a world characterised by thorough lack of trust to the *Leviathan* and Hobbes’s notion of the ‘war of every man against every man’.

It is clear that in explaining state behaviour according to a single variable, Carr’s system oversimplifies. States pursue multiple objectives, these objectives are sometimes compatible and sometimes in conflict, and the motivations of rulers are various. Later Lindsay was to offer similar criticisms of Hans J. Morgenthau. The Marxists were not the only theorists to insist upon a single preconceived pattern ahead of considering, in detail, the evidence.

How was Lindsay’s methodological prescription to be applied to the acquisition of knowledge in the discipline of international relations? The circumstances of the preparation of the December 1954 Memorandum have already been noted. Lindsay pointed out that the ANU’s founders took differing views of the subject, Hancock preferring studies of international organisation, Eggleston being a champion of a ‘science’ of international relations.41 Although

41 ‘Future of the Department of International Relations at the ANU’, 14 December 1954, Lindsay Papers.
Lindsay does not make an explicit statement to this effect, in rejecting the former as largely ‘factual’ he identified it as mere empirical work unguided by a hypothesis. As to Eggleston, his approach could be characterised as ‘speculative and theoretical’; Lindsay here had in mind his critique of Carr. In endeavouring to explain the whole pattern of phenomena, such a science would, perforce, rest upon the kind of narrow fundamental propositions found in realist theory, and would thus be subject to the same objections. Work on putative general theories was likely to result in a species of scholasticism.

As there was no generally accepted theory in the discipline, ‘international relations’ was more a ‘field of study’ than a normal academic discipline like anthropology, and as such involved much borrowing of information and techniques from other disciplines. For the ANU to focus upon training students under current circumstances (and here Lindsay clearly had in mind the small size of the Department and the very limited library resources) was problematic. To replicate a teaching program of the American type would have entailed more staff and many contributions from the other social sciences and perhaps beyond; moreover the products of such a course may not readily find employment. Therefore, research should be the main objective of the Department. Given that, unlike the natural sciences, ‘the nature of the subject gives comparatively little guidance in the choice of research topics’, other principles of selection needed to be found. Lindsay advanced the view that research should be problem oriented, and in Australia both official circles and the public at large stood in need of more information and analysis of a whole range of ‘interesting and important problems’. Geography and social responsibility alike suggested that developments in Southeast Asia and the Far East which ‘are of fairly direct relevance to Australian foreign policy’ should be selected. In view of their strong influence on the conduct of international actors, ‘theories about the nature of the international system’ including Marxism–Leninism and power politics should be the subject of theoretical work. In the absence of a ‘general unified system’ in international relations, the precise program of research work could only be laid down in general terms, as the testing of hypotheses in relation to particular issues would raise yet further questions which must be explored. In general, duplicating work done elsewhere should be avoided, and the particular advantages of the ANU’s location in Australia and in the capital should be exploited.42

42 Ibid.
Lindsay’s role in the AIIA has been noted. In 1955 he was the speaker chosen to deliver the Institute’s Roy Milne lecture, and took this occasion to develop some of these issues further and share his ideas with the public. Though knowledge of international relations was useful, even vital under contemporary conditions, its academic study had been less useful to practitioners and for the purpose of public enlightenment than it might have been. This was the case because it had fallen under the sway of theories purporting to present ‘a science of international relations’. Here Lindsay extended his critique of Carr to the work also of Morgenthau. Although Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations (perhaps one of the most influential books of its kind in that era) contained much ‘shrewd comment and analysis’, its central proposition, that all human behaviour reflects a desire to dominate, was ‘an extremely weak foundation on which to build a general theory of international relations’ (Lindsay 1955f: 8). In advancing this view, Morgenthau had taken what was in fact best considered as a ‘limiting case’ and extended it to all relevant phenomena. Consequently, in his text, Morgenthau entered so many modifications to his central postulate when explaining actual situations that it ceased to be a useful explanatory variable. Lindsay used Morgenthau and Carr as examples of the defects that were bound to occur when ‘a single set of unifying principles’ was employed to develop a theory of international relations:

If the unifying principles are strictly defined the theory is not a satisfactory scientific hypothesis because it yields empirically verifiable implications which are often false. If the unifying principles are loosely defined the theory is not a satisfactory scientific hypothesis because it does not yield empirically verifiable implications (Lindsay 1955f: 10).

Theories of this kind were best considered as ‘pseudo-scientific’. And in their logic they resembled the Marxian theory which was found in much of the thinking of the Communist leadership of China. Here it is evident that Lindsay’s work on China was the source for his insights into the most fruitful approach to be taken by the international relations discipline.

If international relations had been poorly served by premature attempts to create a ‘science’ of the subject, neither had it been advanced very far by ‘purely descriptive’ and historical work of limited ambition. This was not to deny that historical materials were not important as the raw materials of the discipline, but these materials must be employed in an explanation of some kind, rather than in a purely descriptive fashion.
Useful work in the discipline could be done, avoiding these two equally unsatisfactory approaches, by concentrating upon ‘particular problems of limited generality’. One such problem was the motivation and behaviour of ruling groups, Lindsay advertising to his own research on the Communist leadership in China. It was even possible to conceive of ‘experiments’ in international relations, scrutinising and engaging with movements and even governments in order to identify the logic of their avowed positions and intentions. In addition, American experience showed that theoretical work on these questions could be pursued using the methods of Operations Research.

Lindsay then defended his contention that work in the discipline ‘should concentrate on problems with some relevance to current issues’ (Lindsay 1955f: 24). A rational division of labour in academia would leave most historical issues to historians, and the argument from social responsibility would direct the international relations practitioner to the present where there were ‘vital’ issues at stake not excluding even the question of ‘the whole future of our society’ (Lindsay 1955f: 24). In international relations, social responsibility is a weightier matter than in most other disciplines. Yet there is a danger that in satisfying the expected academic standards of exactness and precision, the practical value of the work will be neglected. Here Lindsay, following A. N. Whitehead (1933), contrasted the Hellenic attitude with the Hellenistic, broad enquiry as compared to limited but exact research:

I am not saying that academic work ought not to consider system, exactness and certainty as ideals. I am only saying that these ideals have to be balanced against others that are equally important. If people consider that academic standards require them to confine themselves to work that can yield systemic, exact and certain results they will, in many cases, greatly reduce their ability to produce work that is interesting or useful. If people refuse to produce analyses which, like any scientific hypothesis, may turn out to be wrong, they will not be able to perform the important social function of helping the community to deal with its problems. Not only will society suffer but academic life will tend to become sterile (Lindsay 1955f: 28).

Lindsay’s preference for the Hellenic approach is clear. And he concluded his lecture with a plea for the type of work he outlined on the grounds of its great usefulness and relevance to Australian policy. His final paragraph contains a warning that there were forces at the ANU who were not persuaded by his argument and who, if they were to prevail, would thus abnegate the social responsibility required from the subject’s practitioners. Although these remarks were a reflection of Lindsay’s
particular circumstances, they have many contemporary resonances. At a time when universities across the English speaking world are assessing the value of work not in relation to the problems addressed but as a function of the funds taken to produce the work and the standing of the published results, the latter defined essential in terms of the reception of the work by other scholars similarly engaged, the attractions of working in strictly theoretical areas are very strong, despite the fact that much theoretical work exhibits the very sterility of which Lindsay complains.

These same arguments, and his contentions regarding the teaching of the discipline along American lines, Lindsay put to the Board of Graduate Studies at ANU in September 1955. At this time, although he was acting head of the Department, he was not a member, sitting only ‘by invitation’ from 1957, and it was therefore with some difficulty that he endeavoured to have his arguments considered by those with the power of decision. The same foundations for his views—the limited nature of real scientific (as opposed to pseudo-scientific) knowledge in the field, social responsibility, the need to inform public opinion, and the immediate value to Australia—are all in evidence. Limitations of resources, library materials and personnel as much as the current limitations in the discipline were all factors that militated against aiming at producing a department principally devoted to training. And if historical and descriptive research was to be conducted it would be difficult to maintain the standards seen in the best institutions abroad, and it would certainly not conform to the requirements of social responsibility.

In May 1957, Lindsay tried again to put his position on his discipline to debate, this time as a member of the Board of Graduate Studies. His submission was written while he was awaiting a reply to the first letter he had sent to Wight, and he was therefore in some doubt as to the future of his work at the ANU. Directly to the Board he expounded the same methodological arguments for ‘fundamental research’, but dwelt at greater length on the rationale for the establishment of the ANU and linked this rationale to the importance of developments in Asia and their impact on Australia. Adverting to the work in hand in the Department on Asia he then observed:

It is hard to see how the ANU could justify a decision to turn a Department which has been developing fundamental research related to important
problems of Australian society into a Department doing work of purely esoteric academic interest, a decision which may have been taken in the case of the Department of International Relations.43

Reference has already been made to Lindsay’s submission of 1957 to the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. The submission makes many of the same arguments; given that ‘research in international relations can have great value for the handling of foreign policy’, its originality was to look forward to the prospects for future research in Australia. The AIIA and the Department of International Relations were likely to produce the best work of interest to policy-makers, but additional sums were needed if there was any thought of matching the kind of research done abroad. As to the Department, Lindsay feared it was headed in the direction of ‘purely academic’ studies as opposed to a research program of ‘relevance to Australian problems’. A fundamental defect of the former was that it was not rooted in an awareness that the discipline tended to be dominated by the standards and concerns of countries far removed from the problems confronting Australia. For Australia to rely upon work done in the metropoles was to assume an identity of perspective and interest which may not have existed: ‘Australian interests are not identical with those of the U.S.A. or the U.K. which means that questions of interest to Australian research workers may be largely neglected by workers in other countries.’ Again, Lindsay’s remarks also have a contemporary relevance. For example, ‘the study of SEATO produced last year by a Chatham House group has very little on the Australian position.’44 Lindsay suggested that a study of SEATO, bringing the collective talents of the Department to bear to consider the Australian perspective, would be a worthwhile enterprise. Webb had also become convinced of the importance of this research, and subsequently chaired the group in the Department which began work on this theme in early 1958. The published result, \textit{SEATO: Six Studies} (Modelski 1962), became something of an intellectual landmark in the emergence of Australia focused Asia scholarship.

Although each of these writings was a response, in part, to Lindsay’s institutional preoccupations, to interpret them solely in that context would

---

43 Memorandum to the Board of Graduate Studies, 10 May 1957: Lindsay Papers.

44 The Organisation of Research in International Relations, Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, 1957, 11: Lindsay Papers.
be to trivialise their content. They are all based upon a sophisticated knowledge of scientific method, incorporate a sound critique of ideas then fashionable and influential but flawed as a research program for the discipline, develop a coherent view of the current limits of training in the field, and show a keen awareness of the contribution international relations work might make to public awareness and to the informed framing of Australian foreign policy. Lindsay’s deep knowledge of China provides the context for these contentions, but drawing out the implications of his work on China provided him with the basis for a comprehensive view of the discipline.

THE LOGIC OF LINDSAY’S AUSTRALIAN CAREER

While committed to rationality and the scientific method, Lindsay was well aware that political leaders (and other figures in authority) often behaved according to other standards. These standards included systems of thought which claimed to be rational but which, because they rested upon propositions of allegedly wide applicability which could not be satisfactorily verified, could on that account be categorised as ‘pseudo-scientific’. Marxism–Leninism was thus clearly a pseudo-science, but the doctrine of ‘power politics’ (or ‘realism’) in international relations exhibited many of the same characteristics. Though Lindsay nowhere adverts to it, if he had read Wight’s (1946) work on ‘power politics’ in its initial formulation (as he might have done), Lindsay might well have come to the conclusion that Wight was a member, albeit critical, of the realist school.

Any analysis of international affairs had to take account of two incontrovertible facts. First, the human race was threatened with annihilation as a result of the invention and proliferation of nuclear weapons. Second, the governments of some major states were in thrall, to a greater or lesser extent, to pseudo-scientific doctrines which, because they distorted reality, could lead to disastrous miscalculations in foreign policy. It followed that conscientious analysts of international relations had an over-riding duty to promote intellectual means which would facilitate rational conduct in international affairs. And the particular focus of Lindsay’s work, China, was for evident and sufficient historical reasons, in the hands of a movement in which rational and pseudo-scientific approaches were in competition, Lindsay here advancing a position which was at variance with the received wisdom on China of the era but which subsequently appears largely accurate. Moreover, to the extent that ‘realism’ of the Morgenthau school was influential in the United States, the rational management of American foreign policy could not be assured.
In the analysis of Chinese policy, Lindsay possessed highly exceptional expertise. In some respects this was to prove a mixed blessing; precisely because he was the only academic in the English-speaking world who knew personally the leaders of Communist China (holding discussions with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in 1949 and again in 1954), his view of their conduct was more surely founded than that of any of his contemporaries, a situation as likely to prove in academia a source of jealousy as a reason for recognition. Meanwhile, in his transplantation to Australia, he could see plainly both that China was by far the most important country in Australia’s region, and that work on and about China at the ANU might escape some of the biases and shortcomings of work in established European and American capitals, just as it would serve unique Australian interests. There was a chance it could also contribute to that lessening of tensions which would follow if only rationality could be accorded greater sway in the practice of foreign policy, and thus be in accordance with the pre-eminent duty of the contemporary analyst. In thinking through these problems he hit upon a possible modus operandi for relations between China and the West that is as applicable today as it was at the height of the Cold War.

Lindsay’s conscientious and energetic embrace of the opportunities offered by Australia was at first productive. But, as has been shown, he fell foul of bureaucratic and hierarchic obstacles when he sought to apply (acting as head of his department) his understanding of scientific method to the question of the development of his discipline within the new university. It may also be suspected that a group of, in some cases, quite youthful and modestly published scholars found the presence of a multilingual and multidisciplinary peer of the realm intimidating and thus sought refuge in university process to constrain his role. Tragically, he became diverted into a personal crusade against the university figures responsible, a response understandable in his personal circumstances but bound to be fruitless, university officials being no more likely to condemn their own conduct than their political counterparts in Beijing or Washington. The greater tragedy, however, in this episode is to have obscured Lindsay’s carefully reasoned and path-breaking approach to his subject, and to have rendered his significant contribution to the Australian National University and to work there on the international relations discipline to a footnote devoted to issues of personality rather than to ideas.
REFERENCES


Hancock, W. K., 1976, Professing History (Sydney: Sydney University Press).

Lindsay, Hsiao Li, 2007, Bold Plum: With the Guerrillas in China’s War Against Japan (Morrisville, NC: Lulu Press).

Lindsay, Michael, 1944, North China Front (London: China Campaign Committee).


JAMES COTTON

— 1955a, China and the Cold War: A Study in International Politics (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press).
Wight, Martin, 1946, Power Politics ‘Looking Forward’ Pamphlet no. 8 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs).
Department of International Relations

PUBLICATIONS

Send all orders to:
Publishing, Distributing and Imaging
ANU College of Asia and the Pacific
The Australian National University
Canberra ACT 0200 Australia
Phone: +61 2 6125 3269 Fax: +61 2 6125 9975
E-mail: thelma.sims@anu.edu.au
Web: http://rspas.anu.edu.au/bookshop

Please note: From 2006, Working Papers are available only as downloadable files from the website. Working Papers from 1995 to 2005 are available both for download and in hard copy. Papers published before 1995 are available in hard copy only.

KEYNOTES

09 Australia's security and prosperity: Ideas for 2020,
by William Maley, Hilary Charlesworth, Hugh White, Andrew MacIntyre and Robin Jeffrey

08 Australian foreign policy futures: Making middle-power leadership work?,
by Lorraine Elliott, Greg Fry, William T. Tow and John Ravenhill

07 APEC and the search for relevance: 2007 and beyond,
by Lorraine Elliott, John Ravenhill, Helen E. S. Nesadurai and Nick Bisley

06 Religion, faith and global politics,
by Lorraine Elliott, Mark Beeson, Shahram Akbarzadeh, Greg Fealy and Stuart Harris

05 The challenge of United Nations reform,
by Christian Reus-Smit, Marianne Hanson, Hilary Charlesworth and William Maley

04 The North Korean nuclear crisis: Four-plus-two—An idea whose time has come,
by Peter Van Ness

03 War with Iraq?,
by Amin Saikal, Peter Van Ness, Hugh White, Peter C. Gratton and Stuart Harris

02 Refugees and the myth of the borderless world,
by William Maley, Alan Dupont, Jean-Pierre Fonteyne, Greg Fry, James Jupp, and Thuy Do

01 The day the world changed? Terrorism and world order,
by Stuart Harris, William Maley, Richard Price, Christian Reus-Smit and Amin Saikal
WORKING PAPERS
WP2010/1 The time has come for a treaty to ban weapons in space, by Peter Van Ness
WP2009/1 Australia as a supplier of uranium to the region: Implications, by Stuart Harris
WP2008/6 Institutionalising Northeast Asia: The energy market, by Stuart Harris
WP2008/5 Raymond Aron and the morality of realism, by Murielle Cozette
WP2008/4 The politics of post-trauma emotions: Securing community after the Bali bombing, by Emma Hutchison
WP2008/3 East Asian regionalism: Much ado about nothing?, by John Ravenhill
WP2008/2 Regional energy security: An elusive objective?, by Stuart Harris
WP2008/1 Designing a mechanism for multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia, by Peter Van Ness
WP2007/5 Understanding emotions in world politics: Reflections on method, by Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison
WP2007/4 Obstinate or obsolete? The US alliance structure in the Asia–Pacific, by William Tow and Amitav Acharya
WP2007/3 Fighting irrelevance: An economic community ‘with ASEAN characteristics’, by John Ravenhill
WP2007/2 Case studies in Chinese diplomacy, by Stuart Harris
WP2007/1 What security makes possible: Some thoughts on critical security studies, by Anthony Burke
WP2006/4 Is China an economic threat to Southeast Asia?, by John Ravenhill
WP2006/3 Blair, Brown and the Gleneagles agenda: Making poverty history, or confronting the global politics of uneven development?, by Anthony Payne
WP2006/2 American hegemony: A dangerous aspiration, by James L. Richardson
WP2006/1 Russia and Europe: National identity, national interest, pragmatism, or delusions of empire?, by Robert F. Miller
WP2005/1 Transnational feminism: political strategies and theoretical resources, by Brooke A. Ackerly and Bina D’Costa
WP2004/4 Advocacy or activism: Gender politics in Fiji, by Nicole George
WP2004/2 Rentier shifts, legitimacy, and the social sources of international financial hegemonies, by Leonard Seabrooke
WP2004/1 International relations’ first great debate: Context and tradition, by Darshan Vigneswaran and Joel Quirk
WP2003/5 The neo-Roman republican legacy and international political theory, by Steven Slaughter
WP2003/4  The requirements of European international society: Modernity and nationalism in the Ottoman empire, by Ayla Göl

WP2003/3  Reimagining international society through the emergence of Japanese imperialism, by Shogo Suzuki

WP2003/2  The evolving dialectic between state-centric and human-centric security, by Pauline Kerr

WP2003/1  Does China matter? The global economic issues, by Stuart Harris

WP2002/9  Globalisation and China's diplomacy: Structure and process, by Stuart Harris

WP2002/8  Cosmopolitan theory, militaries and the deployment of force, by Lorraine Elliott and Graeme Cheeseman

WP2002/7  Critical liberalism in international relations, by James L. Richardson

WP2002/6  Bringing legitimacy back in to neo-Weberian state theory and international relations, by Leonard Seabrooke

WP2002/5  Corruption is bad: Normative dimensions of the anti-corruption movement, by Mlada Bukovansky

WP2002/4  Lost at Sea: Australia in the turbulence of world politics, by Christian Reus-Smit

WP2002/3  Normative progress and pathological practices: The modern state and identity politics, by Heather Rae

WP2002/2  Obligation and the political authority of international law, by Christian Reus-Smit

WP2002/1  Engendering international relations: What difference does second-generation feminism make?, by Jacqui True

WP2001/4  Hegemony, not anarchy: Why China and Japan are not balancing US unipolar power, by Peter Van Ness

WP2001/3  Threat perception and developmental states in Northeast Asia, by Tianbiao Zhu

WP2001/2  Political crises in Northeast Asia: An anatomy of the Taiwan and Korean crises, by Stuart Harris

WP2001/1  Relating global tensions: Modern tribalism and postmodern nationalism, by Paul James

WP2000/4  The English School in China: A story of how ideas travel and are transplanted, by Yongjin Zhang

WP2000/3  Death of distance or tyranny of distance? The internet, deterritorialisation, and the anti-globalisation movement in Australia, by Ann Capling and Kim Richard Nossal

WP2000/2  Globalisation and security in East Asia, by Peter Van Ness

WP2000/1  Managing the US base issue in Okinawa: A test for Japanese democracy, by Aurelia George Mulgan
WP1999/5  Internationalisation: What Scholars Make of It?, by Natasha Hamilton-Hart
WP1999/4  The Asian Regional Response to its Economic Crisis and the Global Implications, by Stuart Harris
WP1999/3  ASEAN and the Southeast Asian ‘Haze’: Challenging the Prevailing Modes of Regional Engagement, by James Cotton
WP1999/2  Australia and Nuclear Arms Control as ‘Good International Citizenship’, by Marianne Hanson
WP1999/1  South Pacific Security and Global Change: The New Agenda, by Greg Fry
WP1998/3  The Rise of an Environmental Superpower? Evaluating Japanese Environmental Aid to Southeast Asia, by Peter Dauvergne
WP1998/2  Environmental Insecurity, Forest Management, and State Responses in Southeast Asia, by Peter Dauvergne
WP1998/1  The ASEAN Regional Forum. A Model for Cooperative Security in the Middle East?, by Michael Leifer
WP1997/8  From Paternalism to Partnership: Australia’s Relations with ASEAN, by John Ravenhill
WP1997/7  Globalisation and deforestation in the Asia–Pacific, by Peter Dauvergne
WP1997/6  Corporate Power in the Forests of the Solomon Islands, by Peter Dauvergne
WP1997/5  From Island Factory to Asian Centre: Democracy and Deregulation in Taiwan, by Gregory W. Noble
WP1997/4  The Foreign Policy of the Hawke–Keating Governments: An Interim Review, by James L. Richardson
WP1997/3  Hedley Bull and International Security, by Samuel M. Makinda
WP1997/2  Island Disputes in Northeast Asia, by Andrew Mack
WP1997/1  Nuclear ‘Breakout’: Risks and Possible Responses, by Andrew Mack
WP1996/9  The Rajin-Sonbong Free Trade Zone Experiment: North Korea in Pursuit of New International Linkages, by James Cotton
WP1996/8  The Declining Probability or War Thesis: How Relevant for the Asia–Pacific?, by James L. Richardson
WP1996/7  The China–Japan Relationship and Asia–Pacific Regional Security, by Stuart Harris
WP1996/6  You Just Don’t Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists, by J. Ann Tickner
WP1996/5  Framing the Islands: Knowledge and Power in Changing Australian Images of ‘The South Pacific’, by Greg Fry
WP1996/4  The Constructivist Turn: Critical Theory After the Cold War, by Chris Reus-Smit
WP1996/3  Why Democracies Don’t Fight Each Other: Democracy and Integration, by Harvey Starr
WP1996/2  The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping, by Trevor Findlay
WP1996/1  Ameliorating the Security Dilemma: Structural and Perceptual Approaches to Strategic Reform, by Andrew Butfoy
WP1995/10 Contending Liberalisms: Past and Present, by James L. Richardson
WP1995/9  Industry Policy in East Asia: A Literature Review, by Heather Smith
WP1995/8  Recasting Common Security, by Andy Butfoy
WP1995/7  Russian Policy Towards the ‘Near Abroad’: The Discourse of Hierarchy, by Wynne Russell
WP1995/6  Culture, Relativism and Democracy: Political Myths About ‘Asia’ and the ‘West’, by Stephanie Lawson
WP1995/5  The World Trade Organisation—Throwing the Baby Out With the Bath Water?, by P.A. Gordon
WP1995/3  In Search of a New Identity: Revival of Traditional Politics and Modernisation in Post-Kim Il Sung North Korea, by Alexandre Y. Mansourov
WP1995/2  Implications of Taiwan–Chinese Relations for Australia, by Stuart Harris
WP1995/1  New Light on the Russo–Japanese Territorial Dispute, by Kimie Hara
WP1994/10 China’s Public Order Crisis and Its Strategic Implications, by Greg Austin
WP1994/9  Nuclear Endgame on the Korean Peninsula, by Andrew Mack
WP1994/7  ‘Climbing Back onto the Map?: The South Pacific Forum and the New Development Orthodoxy, by Greg Fry
WP1994/6  The Asia–Pacific: Geopolitical Cauldron or Regional Community?, by James L. Richardson
WP1994/5  North Korea’s Nuclear Program: the Options are Shrinking, by Andrew Mack
WP1994/4  Policy Networks and Economic Cooperation: Policy Coordination in the Asia–Pacific Region, by Stuart Harris
WP1994/3  Australia’s Regional Security Environment, by Stuart Harris
WP1993/10 Nuclear-Free Zones in the 1990s, by Andrew Mack
WP1993/9  Australian Security in the 1990s, by Andrew Mack
WP1993/8  Concepts of Security in the Post-Cold War, by Andrew Mack
WP1993/7  An American New World Order?, by James L. Richardson
WP1993/6  The Return of Practical Reason, by Hayward R. Alker, Jr.
WP1993/5  Gaddis’ Lacuna: Foreign Policy Analysis and the End of the Cold War, by Valerie Hudson
WP1993/4  The Environment and Sustainable Development: An Australian Social Science Perspective, by Stuart Harris
WP1993/3  Environmental Regulation, Economic Growth and International Competitiveness, by Stuart Harris
WP1993/2  Strategic Trade Policy: The East Asian Experience, by Trevor Matthews and John Ravenhill
WP1993/1  The Practice of Common Security: China’s Borders with Russia and India, by Gary Klintworth
WP1992/10  Arms Proliferation in the Asia–Pacific: Causes and Prospects for Control, by Andrew Mack
WP1992/9  Nuclear Dilemmas: Korean Security in the 1990s, by Andrew Mack
WP1992/8  The Case For a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Northeast Asia, by Andrew Mack
WP1992/7  The Gulf War and Australian Political Culture, by James L. Richardson
WP1992/6  The Economic Aspects of Pacific Security, by Stuart Harris
WP1992/5  Moving Target—Korea’s Nuclear Proliferation Potential, by Peter Hayes
WP1992/4  Federalism and Australian Foreign Policy, by Stuart Harris
WP1992/3  New Hierarchies in East Asia: The Post-Plaza Division of Labour, by Mitchell Bernard and John Ravenhill
WP1992/2  Questions About a Post-Cold War International Order, by J.L. Richardson
WP1992/1  After the Cold War and the Gulf War: Prospects for Security in the Asia–Pacific, by Andrew Mack
WP1991/10  The Korean Nuclear Issue, by Song Young Sun
WP1991/9  Implementing Foreign Policy: The Environmental Challenge, by Stuart Harris
WP1991/8  Australia and the South Pacific: From ‘Strategic Denial’ to ‘Constructive Commitment’, by Greg Fry
WP1991/7  ‘Civil Society’ and Nationalism in North Korea: Foundations for Political Change?, by James Cotton
WP1991/6  The Drawbacks of the Detached View: Russia, the USSR and the Pacific, by Artem Rudnitskiy
WP1991/5  China as a Third World State: Foreign Policy and Official National Identity, by Peter Van Ness
WP1991/4  Foreign Policy Analysis, International Relations Theory, and Social Theory: Critique and Reconstruction, by Ian Bell
WP1991/3  Continuity and Change in Cooperative International Regimes: The Politics of the Recent Environment Debate in Antarctica, by Lorraine M. Elliott
WP1991/1  International Trade, Ecologically Sustainable Development and the GATT, by Stuart Harris
WP1990/10  The Influence of the United Nations on the Antarctic System: A Source of Erosion or Cohesion?, by Stuart Harris
WP1990/9  The Limits to Liberalisation in Industrialising Asia: Three Views of the State, by James Cotton
WP1990/8  Informal Theories of Rationality, by James L. Richardson
WP1990/7  Peacekeeping in the South Pacific: Some Questions for Prior Consideration, by Greg Fry
WP1990/6  The Politics of Baltic Nationalisms, by William Maley
WP1990/5  Is Unilateral Trade Liberalisation the Answer?, by Trevor Matthews and John Ravenhill
WP1990/4  India in Southwest Asia, by Amin Saikal
WP1990/3  The Environmental Challenge: The New International Agenda, by Stuart Harris
WP1990/2  The Soviet Far East, by Geoff Jukes
WP1990/1  Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building: The Cairns Croup and the Uruguay Round, by Andrew Fenton Cooper and Richard A. Higgott
WP1989/5  Economic Change in the International System Implications for Australia’s Prospects, by Stuart Harris
WP1989/4  Analysing the Impact of International Sanctions on China, by Peter Van Ness
WP1989/2  Agricultural Trade and Australian Foreign Policy in the 1990s, by Stuart Harris
WP1989/1  The Changing Central Balance and Australian Policy, by Coral Bell
STUDIES IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Ethics and Foreign Policy, edited by Paul Keal
Korea Under Roh Tae-woo: Democratisation, Northern Policy, and Inter-Korean Relations, edited by James Cotton
1. Asian–Pacific Security After the Cold War, edited by T.B. Millar and James Walter
2. The Post-Cold War Order: Diagnoses and Prognoses, edited by Richard Leaver and James L. Richardson
3. Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy, 3rd ed., by Coral Bell
5. Asian Flashpoint: Security and the Korean Peninsula, edited by Andrew Mack
6. Taiwan in the Asia–Pacific in the 1990s, edited by Gary Klintworth
7. Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia–Pacific, edited by Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill
8. The Gulf War: Critical Perspectives, edited by Michael McKinley
10. The New Agenda for Global Security, Cooperating for Peace and Beyond, edited by Stephanie Lawson
11. Presumptive Engagement: Australia’s Asia–Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s, by Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr
12. Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking After the Cold War, edited by Graeme Cheseman and Robert Bruce
13. Pacific Rim Development: Integration and Globalisation in the Asia–Pacific Economy, edited by Peter J. Rimmer
14. Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy, edited by David Lee and Christopher Waters
15. Cambodia—From Red to Blue: Australia’s Initiative for Peace, by Ken Berry
18. Weak and Strong States in Asia–Pacific Societies, edited by Peter Dauvergne
19. Australian Outlook: a History of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, by J.D. Legge
21. The Politics of Nuclear Non-Proliferation, edited by Carl Ungerer and Marianne Hanson
CANBERRA STUDIES IN WORLD AFFAIRS

CS21 Politics, Diplomacy and Islam: Four Case Studies, edited by Coral Bell
CS22 The Changing Pacific: Four Case Studies, edited by Coral Bell
CS23 New Directions in International Relations? Australian Perspectives, edited by Richard Higgott
CS24 Australia and the Multinationals: A Study of Power and Bargaining in the 1980s, by Neil Renwick
CS25 Refugees in the Modern World, edited by Amin Saikal
CS27 Northeast Asian Challenge: Debating the Garnaut Report, edited by J.L. Richardson
CS28 The ANZUS Documents, edited by Alan Burnett with Thomas-Durell Young and Christine Wilson
CS29 Human Rights in the Asia–Pacific Region, edited by John Girling
CS30 International Relations: Global and Australian Perspectives on an Evolving Discipline, edited by Richard Higgott and J.L. Richardson

AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY PAPERS

Australia’s Alliance Options: Prospect and Retrospect in a World of Change, by Coral Bell
Coping With Washington: Players, Conventions and Strategies, by Davis Bobrow
The European Community in Context, by John Groom
Australia’s Human Rights Diplomacy, by Ian Russell, Peter Van Ness and Beng-Huat Chua
Selling Mirages: The Politics of Arms Trading, by Graeme Cheeseman
The Search for Substance: Australia–India Relations into the Nineties and Beyond, by Sandy Gordon
Protecting the Antarctic Environment: Australia and the Minerals Convention, by Lorraine Elliott
Australia’s Taiwan Policy 1942–1992, by Gary Klintworth
Australia and the New World Order: Evatt in San Francisco, 1945, by W.J. Hudson
The Beijing Massacre: Australian Responses, by Kim Richard Nossal
The Pacific Patrol Boat Project: A Case Study of Australian Defence Cooperation, by Anthony Bergin
Australia’s Evolving American Relationship: Interests, Processes and Prospects for Australian Influence, by Henry S. Albinski