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WHY DEMOCRACIES DON'T FIGHT EACH OTHER:
DEMOCRACY AND INTEGRATION

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ABSTRACT

While a large and growing literature has emerged which investigates the impact of the expansion of democracy on foreign policy and international politics, much of it has been characterised by insufficient attention to theoretical and conceptual clarity. To address such problems, this essay is an exercise in concept clarification. Most importantly, this article stresses that the democratic peace is a subset of the processes and results of integration, that it fits within an integration framework, and that it works according to processes already identified by integration theory which permits the synthesis of a number of ‘contending’ explanations for the democratic peace. As part of this argument, the article also stresses the transparent nature of democracy, emphasising the importance of the mutual perceptions of two democracies that the other is clearly a democracy. Finally, this article reminds scholars that the focus of the democratic peace proposition is on war. This is crucial for the testing and extension of theories that explain the democratic peace. While it is important to explore our theories in terms of their extension to other conflictual phenomena, we must be careful in specifying exactly what these relationships should look like.
WHY DEMOCRACIES DON'T FIGHT EACH OTHER:
DEMOCRACY AND INTEGRATION*

Harvey Starr

What is to be explained?
A large and growing literature has emerged that investigates the impact of the expansion of democracy on foreign policy and international politics. Much of this literature has been characterised by insufficient attention to theoretical and conceptual clarity and the logical development of its argument. This essay identifies some of these problems explicitly, and suggests how to address them. This essay will not present any new empirical data or data analysis. It is not intended to be a synoptic literature review of theory and findings on democracy and war, conflict and cooperation, or even a partial attempt to order and synthesise the most recent work in the area (as was Starr, 1992a).¹ This essay is an exercise in concept clarification and reconceptualisation. By linking the democratic peace to integration theory, for example, my aim is to contribute to our understanding of democracy and the democratic peace.

Over the past half-decade there has been a renewed interest in these topics. Almost every issue of the major journals in the field of international relations contains at least one article devoted to the empirical analysis of the democratic peace, a theoretical or analytic discussion of why the democratic peace has occurred, or a critique of the democratic peace literature. Such critiques will question either the existence of the democratic peace, whether or not it truly challenges realist models of world politics, and/or whether or not it is trivial in terms of prevailing theories of international politics.

However, much of this writing on the democratic peace—whether devoted to analysis, proof, or critique—loses track of exactly what is under discussion or what is to be explained. That is, the author(s) often forgets that the democratic peace proposition (or hypothesis, or law, or whatever) is a statement that claims the

* I acknowledge with gratitude the helpful comments provided by Bruce Russett, Charles Kegley, Steve Chan, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and James L. Richardson on earlier drafts of this paper. I also wish to thank the Department of International Relations, The Australian National University, which provided me a home as a Visiting Fellow during the revision of this article.

¹ Note also that a number of points made here have been raised elsewhere in the literature on the democratic peace. Since I have not attempted a full survey of the literature, I apologise in advance to those not cited in this paper.
following: there is a virtual absence of war among dyads of democratic polities. Thus, the democratic peace proposition (to be noted as $DPprop$) is about the absence of war. The $DPprop$ is meant to explain the lack of war between pairs of democracies (or democratic dyads). It is about a set of conditions that explains the variance in a specific dependent variable—war.\footnote{This somewhat tendentious statement of the central concern of the $DPprop$ has been made consciously so. The $DPprop$ is specifically about the escalation of conflict to the level of large-scale organised violence between state actors. Given that war has been perhaps the singlemost central concern to students of international relations across history, uncovering one factor, variable, or set of conditions that can be considered a sufficient condition for the absence of war (or almost complete absence of war) is a stunning achievement.}

The above comment does not mean, however, that we must look at war between pairs of democracies and then stop. Much of the debate, as will be discussed below, is about the nature and generalisability of the theories developed to explain the $DPprop$. One way to evaluate theories and to compare their relative explanatory power is to see what else they can do for us, and how far their logic can take us in understanding other phenomena; here, what other behaviors, outcomes, or events are implied by the theories that explain the $DPprop$? If we have a theory that we think works, then what else should we expect to see? As suggested in Most & Starr (1989) it would be more useful not to ask which theory is ‘correct’, or works ‘best’, but which explanation works best under what conditions. Each theory or model should be looked at as a ‘story’ which not only produces some particular outcome (peace in democratic dyads), but, under certain conditions, other outcomes as well.

Such an approach to theory, of course, follows the Lave and March (1975, pp.19–20) procedure for the development of disciplined speculation in the social sciences:

1. Observe some facts.
2. Look at the facts as though they were the end result of some unknown process (model). Then speculate about processes that might have produced such a result.
3. Deduce other results (implications–consequences–predictions) from the model.
4. Then ask whether these other implications are true and produce new models if necessary.

Therefore, if some explanation is set forward for the $DPprop$, what else should we expect to follow from that explanation or model? And, does empirical research
support such expectations? It is here, regarding Olson’s (1982, p.13) ‘consilience’, that we can move beyond simply ‘war’.

War is not simply conflict. It is not the same as escalation, minor incidents, intervention, or even covert operations (all of which have been investigated as ‘tests’ of the DPprop). War is sustained violent conflict fought by organised armed forces which are directed by a governmental authority (see Most & Starr 1989, ch.4; see also the articles in Bremer & Cusack, 1993). While war can be subsumed under more general forms of social conflict, and while war may also be seen as the ultimate stage of a conflictual escalatory process, war is simply not the same phenomenon as either social conflict or escalation. While the exact levels of casualties and/or duration and/or capabilities committed that are needed to identify a ‘war’ can be debated, war is more than a militarised incident, a minor incursion, or the like. War’s defining feature is a large-scale, organised violence that either imposes heavy costs on the participants, or creates the potential for the participants to suffer heavy costs.

War is considered the ultima ratio by realists; that is, the ultimate form of self-help to which states may resort in the anarchic Westphalian system. Indeed, throughout much of the history of this system one of the defining elements of the sovereign state was its right under international law to wage war. As distinct from the post-Second World War legal regime that has made aggressive war illegal (and which has placed strong constraints on any use of force beyond that of self-defense), war had simply been a special legal condition that could exist between states. Thus war was, and was perceived as, an integral component of the anarchic Westphalian state system.

Yet, the DPprop makes a simple empirical claim—that war does not occur in democratic dyads, (or, that it has occurred in only a very few, extraordinarily rare, cases). To realist critics this appears to be a radical claim. If, however, the DPprop is placed within the context of the peace created by processes of integration, the position may not appear to be so ‘radical’. After all, both the theory and findings reported in the integration literature present exactly the same type of challenge to realism—identifying state behavior which, according to realists, was not supposed to occur in the international system. It is obvious that integration theories/studies are

3 Olson (1982, p.13) asserts that, ‘If a theory explains facts of quite diverse kinds it has what William Whewell, a nineteenth-century writer on scientific method, called “consilience”’.

4 This is one of the main themes of the long term Two-Level Security Management project I have developed to investigate various commonalities across different forms of social conflict; see Starr (1994).

5 For analysis and interpretation of Deutschian integration theory (e.g., Deutsch, et al., 1957) see Puchala (1981) and Lijphart (1981). For a more general discussion of this argument, see Starr (1995).
not under attack by realist critics in a manner similar to the current response to the democratic peace literature (see, for example, Spiro, 1994; Layne, 1994). Integration in world politics cannot be ignored in the commentary and critique of the democratic peace. A key theme to be developed below is that the phenomenon called the $DPprop$ is a subset of the processes and results of integration (especially with reference to the Deutschian model of pluralistic security communities).

The confusion

The $DPprop$ is about war—the empirical fact that democracies never (or almost never) go to war against one another. A variety of statistical and case studies (e.g., Doyle, 1986; Ray, 1993, 1995; Russett, 1993) have pretty well proved the $DPprop$: that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to find war (clearcut, large scale organised, sustained, violent conflict) between two democratic (clearcut, readily recognisable as democracy) states. The critiques of this work are not critiques of the $DPprop$ (as a correlation). The enterprise engaging the attention of scholars has been the problem of developing theories which explain why this should be the case. Numerous analysts (e.g., Russett 1993) have set out two basic types of explanations for the $DPprop$—one based on ‘democratic culture’ or norms and one based on the structural or institutional constraints that exist on decision makers within democracies. These two basic explanations have several variations. The preponderance of the extant critiques are directed at the theories which have been developed to explain this behavioral phenomenon.

To be fair, both proponents and now opponents of the $DPprop$ are engaging in some version of the Lave & March process noted above. They have observed some phenomenon in the world—lack of cases in which democracies go to war against democracies—and then have developed ‘stories’ that would account for that phenomenon. The next step in the Lave & March process is to ask what else would one expect to see or to follow if the story were valid. To do this in regard to the $DPprop$ it is essential to have a full understanding of democracy—its nature, the processes involved, what makes it different from other forms of government and government—societal arrangements—before one could usefully produce a story that fits, and that generates additional propositions about what the world is like. This point was raised in Starr (1992a), which also reviewed some ‘stylized facts’ to see if the $DPprop$ could simply be extended to whether or not democracies treat each other ‘better’ across a number of behavioral phenomena (such as the distribution of postwar payoffs). On the basis of a small sample of research results the answer was ‘no’. However, it is important to understand that ‘treating each other better’ is different from not going to war.

Many of the discussions of the ‘limitations’ of the $DPprop$ investigate such international behavior as interventions, militarised disputes, escalation, etc., and
similarly conclude that democracies may not treat each other 'better'. To follow the argument here, these exercises do not disprove or weaken the DPprop. What they do say is that some specific theory of why the DPprop occurs, when extended at least in part through its own internal logic, is not adequate by itself to explain related behaviors. That is, for a more complete explanation which is also consistent with extensions, the theory/model must be more clearly or fully specified. It would be valuable in assessing competing explanations to see which explanations of the DPprop could be extended to other behavior, to assess comparative power as well as the limits of such explanations. But, if theories/models fail in these other areas, or do not work as expected, it does not necessarily cast doubt on the DPprop itself, only some single, specific model which purports to explain how and why the DPprop holds.  

Integration: security communities and the democratic peace

Such observations about specifying and evaluating theory may be illustrated by returning to theories of integration. The end product of the process of integration according to Deutschian theory is the 'security community':

A security community is a group of people which has become 'integrated'. By integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure...dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population. By sense of community we mean a belief...that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change (Deutsch, et al. 1957, p.5).

As with the DPprop, the Deutschian definition of integration focuses on peace, and the conditions for peace; but it does more. A security community involves not only the absence of war, but more importantly, the absence of the military option in the interactions of the states within the security community. Additionally, Deutsch allows for the existence of pluralistic security communities—where such conditions can hold even among a set of independent, non-amalgamated, states. It should be clear then, that the Deutschian pluralistic security community is an outcome which

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6 It is always possible that, following the logic of 'nice laws' (Most & Starr, 1989; Cioffi & Starr, 1995), explanations of the DPprop are limited to the condition of war and peace. Yet, the search for extensions is part of the process of looking for general explanations, of asking 'of what is this an instance' (Rosenau, 1980). While it is possible that explanations of the DPprop might not be very good at explaining other behavior, the search for extensions is an important part of the process of looking for such broader phenomena.

7 For a particularly good description of this phenomenon in action, see Archer's (1996) discussion of the 'Nordic Zone of Peace', (a Scandinavian security community).
is broader than, but overarches, the democratic peace phenomenon. Thus, an investigation of integration may provide some clues in the explanation of the \textit{DPprop}.

When we look closely at the components of the Deutschian social-communication model of the integration process as well as the neo-functional process model of Ernst Haas, we find all the primary components of the two central theories used by scholars to explain the \textit{DPprop}: (1) the structural constraints model involves the constraints of organisations and formal laws or constitutions; (2) the democratic culture argument involves the presence of community, responsiveness, shared values, and norms. Thus, key components of the two basic explanations of how the \textit{DPprop} works are found in the two basic theories of integration. Additionally, the theories of integration stress the role of learning in the development of norms of cooperation and a sense of community; they stress the need for mutual benefits and the positive impact of interdependence on the management of interdependent relations. Again, these are key components of theories attempting to explain the \textit{DPprop}.

From an integration perspective, what does it mean when one uncovers evidence that democracies might intervene in other democracies, or escalate a conflict with another democracy to the point where the military option is considered? From this perspective, all it means is that there has been, to that point in time, \textit{incomplete integration} in terms of ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’. That is, the democracies involved exist within a not yet fully formed, or imperfectly formed, pluralistic security community. Here, under certain dispute conditions, the military option may indeed be raised—but still \textit{does not} escalate to actual war. Does such a situation invalidate theories of integration? Is there not a difference between claiming that integration does not exist or is a failure, and merely indicating that the processes involved have not yet produced the final end-product of integration—the pluralistic security community as Deutsch envisioned it? The behaviors that are (wrongly) claimed to invalidate or disprove the \textit{DPprop}, would not be used to argue against the reality and explanations of integration; they may simply indicate that the processes creating integration had not finished. If this is the case, then we should look at those conditions which are specified as necessary and/or sufficient for integration.

The ‘confusion’ highlighted in this section is about the nature of the theories scholars have used in attempting to explain the \textit{DPprop}. I have suggested that this

\footnote{With such prerequisites for the formation of security communities as compatibility of values, the extension of political elites, and multiple forms of transactions and communication (Deutsch, et al., 1957), it is not surprising that the only historically identified security communities—either amalgamated or pluralistic—are composed of democracies.}
can, in part, be clarified through the use of Deutschian integration theory. Before returning to further correspondences in conditions and processes between pluralistic security communities and the democratic pace, it is necessary to discuss one of the basic features of democracy that is central to any theory attempting to explain the $DP_{prop}$—the notion of transparency.

**What does democracy mean?**

*Democracy and transparency*

It was argued above that analysts need to have ‘a full understanding of democracy—its nature, the processes involved, what makes it different from other forms of government and government–societal arrangements’. One possible factor which distinguishes democracy from other governmental forms is its ‘transparency’. Democratic transparency—the openness of its political processes and the vast amount of economic, political, and social information which is public and generally available—is a prerequisite for democracy as conceptualised in terms of the contestation for political leadership, regardless of the specific definition used (see Dahl, 1989, 1971).

Such a conceptualisation sees democracy as providing an environment within which oppositions can effectively challenge incumbent governmental office holders for power in a legal, legitimate manner through prescribed procedures. In order to do so, the range of political and civil liberties commonly understood as those embodied in the American Bill of Rights, must obtain—freedom of speech and the press, freedom of assembly, freedom from a range of techniques of repression available to a government. It is only through transparency that a society can monitor and know of abuses of political and civil liberties. It is only through transparency that a government would fear the repercussions of such abuses. Thus, only transparency can provide the safe environment for effective governmental opposition that is at the core of democracy as conceptualised in terms of the contestation for political leadership.

The concept of transparency is also a useful point of departure for investigating how the nature of democracy could lead us to the $DP_{prop}$. Why should transparency be important? One way to approach this question is to look at the arguments presented by Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman (1992) regarding the policy choices of ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ and how these two types of states are related to democratic and non-democratic states.

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9 Note that much of the material to follow is drawn from Starr (1992b), which should be consulted for a more complete treatment.
Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman (1992) develop the extensive form ‘international interaction game’ to investigate the behavior of ‘instrumentally rational’ foreign policy decision makers. They use this game to analyse how the sequence of actions taken by decision makers may lead to war or one of several forms of peaceful resolution. What is key to us here is that they present the central problem facing decision makers as that of separation: how to distinguish what type of opponent one is facing in terms of its preferences and preference ordering. Under what conditions will the opponent prefer the status quo? prefer negotiations over other alternatives? prefer capitulation to war? prefer war it initiates over war initiated by the other party? They analyse the outcomes that will be produced with states that might be characterised as ‘doves’ (states with preference orderings that make them generally averse to the use of force, depending, of course, on the nature of the opponent they face), as they interact with other doves or non-doves. They present a proof demonstrating that if both states are doves, and both know that the other is a dove, then war outcomes are impossible. As they note at several points, a crucial assumption is that there is ‘common knowledge’ by each side of the other's dovishness.10

Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman (1992, ch.5) apply these results to the puzzle of why democracies rarely fight one another. In the real world, they argue, decision makers can never be sure what type of state they are facing—dove or non-dove. How can both sides in the real world attain the common knowledge regarding dove/non-dove that is simply assumed in the game model? While decision makers cannot know who is a dove/non-dove, Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman argue that there is fairly common knowledge whether or not the opponent is a liberal democracy. Basing their logic on a combination of the theories used to explain the \textit{DPprop}, if a certain country is a liberal democracy then decision makers know that the leaders of that state will be under greater constraints not to use force, and will bear heavier costs than the leaders of non-democracies if they do. All of this is known because of the various elements of transparency—the free movement of information in liberal democracies, the existence of opposition groups, and knowledge of internal politics, institutions, and debates.11

10 Common knowledge means there is no hidden information. Common knowledge has been defined as: any information that each player knows and the fact that each player has such knowledge is known to every other player. This assumption is crucial, because Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman also show that under imperfect information there exist conditions whereby doves could fight other doves. Fearon (1994) makes a somewhat similar argument when he asserts that democracies are able to signal their intentions—clearly—to one another.

11 I have summarized their argument as follows: (1) two states who are doves, and know that each of the pair are doves will not go to war; (2) this requires common knowledge, which cannot be assumed in the real world; (3) various aspects of liberal democracies
The transparency of democracy means that outside observers can see into such states, scrutinise the activity that occurs within the society and political system, and recognise that the political behaviors conform to some broadly accepted notion of democracy, and are robust enough to cross some threshold in order to be called democracy. Such transparency is inherent in truly open societies. Transparency that reveals the democratic nature of a polity is crucial for Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman’s use of democracy as an indicator of dovishness. The Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman formulation only works when each party can be clearly recognised as a democracy by the other party. The mutual recognition of democracy (which equates to dovishness) is crucial to the use of the international interaction game to explain the $DP_{prop}$. It is also central to how most other theories of the $DP_{prop}$ ultimately work. Transparency (including the degree or level of transparency) is thus crucial to how we measure democracy and which cases we look at to test our theories.

Transparency means that leaders and populations of other states can see that a country provides for the political and civil liberties which permit the regularised and legal contestation for political power. In democratic dyads this means both sides can see into each other. On one simple level, this makes war between democracies much more difficult than war between a democracy and an authoritarian regime. One mechanism by which the leaders of states create a willingness for societal masses (and elites) to support and prosecute a war, is the creation of an enemy image which involves the dehumanisation of the opponent. A number of studies indicate that this enemy image is used to portray the opponent as evil and/or non-human in some way—thus justifying the use of violence against such an enemy and warranting the costs of war. Images of the ‘Hun’ on British posters during World War I, or the images of the Japanese in American films during World War II exemplify this phenomenon (e.g. see Dower, 1986).

With two democracies, and the amount of information flowing in and out of each, it is almost impossible to create such an image. If both countries are democracies, it is likely that they share a broad range of transactions, and that the levels of transactions are high enough that each society knows a great deal about the other; such a multiplicity of transactions and communication is also strongly

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12 As one example, Kelman & Hamilton (1989, p.163) note that, 'When victims are dehumanized...the moral restraints against killing or harming them become less effective. Groups of people who are systematically demonised, assigned to inferior or dangerous categories, and identified by derogatory labels are readily excluded from the bonds of human empathy and the protection of moral and legal precepts'.
consistent with Deutschian integration theory (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1990, p.436). Such transparency means that each party has too much information about the other to create convincing enemy images, for either elites or masses. It means that one important component often used to mobilise societal support, and willingness to bear the costs of war, is unavailable to democratic leaders when facing one another. Not only does transparency mean that leaders cannot use the evil/non-human image of the enemy, but the reason for that unavailability lies in seeing that the opponent respects the political and civil liberties within its domestic political arena—including the free press which provides much of this information.¹³

**Lesser forms of conflict**

The point immediately above follows from a Kantian argument as expanded by Russett (1993)—that the political processes within democracies may be used to structure relations between democratic states. Both this argument and transparency may be useful in looking at other forms of conflict between pairs of democracies. Many discussions of the DPprop are based on findings which allegedly indicate that democracies have been involved in interventions against other democracies (e.g., Kegley & Hermann, 1995a). Some have seen as even more damning, those studies which indicate the use by some democracies of covert intelligence/intervention operations against other democracies (e.g., Forsythe, 1992; Stedman, 1993). A careful analysis of covert operations within democracies, however, provides evidence in support of the DPprop, not a critique.

Recall the findings of the experimental work being done by Alex Mintz and associates, which tests a ‘political incentive’ explanation for the DPprop (e.g., Geva, DeRouen & Mintz, 1993). This work argues that the leaders of democracies do not pursue war against other democracies because they have no political incentive to do so. The results of their experiments indicate that the use of force by one democracy against another is perceived by the public as incompetent leadership—incompetent in part because the use of force is not seen as being worth the costs or risks, especially in interactions with states where peaceful conflict resolution is expected (see also Fearon, 1994).¹⁴

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¹³ And, as Van Belle (1995, p.12) notes, ‘when two democracies come into conflict, the domestic news media on both sides share common norms of reporting responsibility, accuracy, and accountability. They accept each other as legitimate sources of information and reports travel relatively freely between the news gathering institutions in both states’.

¹⁴ An interesting example may be found in Archer (1996), where he discusses the 1905 separation of Norway from Sweden. After the referendum in Norway showing overwhelming support for the Norwegian government, the Swedish Social Democrat leader Brantling noted in speeches that any attempt by Sweden to use force in Norway would cause a general strike in Sweden. Indeed, King Oscar told the Swedish
The results of Mintz's experiments are also quite consistent with the structure and preference orderings of states in the international interaction game of Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman (1992, ch.4). Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman argue that if two states are doves, and the leaders of each state knows that the other is a dove, then based on expected utility calculations, 'negotiation or the status quo are the only possible equilibrium outcomes of the game'. With the work of Mintz and Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman in mind, it is clear that decision makers leading democracies could expect different levels of domestic opposition and support for the use of covert force against different types of targets. While American leaders generally have not received, and would not expect to receive, widespread and strident criticism when revealing covert operations against countries such as Cuba or Iraq or Libya, they would expect such a reaction if the targets were democratic allies (or even marginal democracies in newly liberalising states).

Indeed, the fact that covert operations against democracies would be roundly denounced across the political spectrum, would lead democratic leaders to hide such activities. In the terms of Putnam's (1988) two-level games, covert action against another democracy would not be included in the domestic (Level II) win-set: such a policy would lose because it would be perceived as illegitimate. Thus, such activities are covert because they would generate high levels of opposition, and leaders wish to keep them out of the open democratic political process. In large part policy makers attempt to keep covert operations secret because the public does not support such activities against democracies; (see also Russett, 1993, pp.12–24). The covertness of the activities used against other democracies simply confirms the conclusions of Mintz and Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman (and by extension some combination of both structural and cultural explanations for the DPprop)—that there is no political benefit attending such activities. It also follows that policy makers keep operations low key—at low levels of violence and levels of forces employed—because higher levels (as they escalate toward war) will bring major societal and political opposition. As Mintz indicates, the public will expect that there are non-violent ways to manage disputes or conflicts with other democracies. And, in fact, research has indicated that democracies are more likely to utilise international organisations

parliament, 'the Union [between Norway and Sweden] is not anything, if it is to be upheld by force'.

Despite these normative and structural constraints, and clear evidence that the cost-benefit calculation will usually work against either covert operations or the overt use of force against other democracies, we know that some elected leaders of democracies do attempt such behavior. The question then becomes what types of individuals—personalities, decision making styles, risk orientations—will push the envelope of public acceptance of violent conflict with other democracies? These questions are central to the ongoing project of Charles Kegley & Margaret Hermann (e.g., 1995b); see also Hermann & Kegley (1995).
and third party mechanisms to resolve their conflicts with one another (see, for example, Dixon 1993, 1994; Raymond 1994).

**Conclusion: democracy and integration**

Most discussions of the $D_{Prop}$ present two basic explanations for the behavior of democracies—democratic political culture and political structure/constraints. Many discussions have also concluded either that neither of these two explanations is adequate, or that they have to be combined in some way (e.g., Farber & Gowa, 1995; Starr, 1992b). If one looks at the $D_{Prop}$ through the lenses of integration theory then these two broad explanations should be used in combination. For the fullest conception of the integration process both Deutschian social communication and Haasian neo-functional models must be considered. In combining these two models one includes an approach that begins with, and builds upon, the growth of common norms, expectations and identities with an approach that begins with, and builds upon, the development of institutions that constrain behavior both through learning and spillover (and increasing ties of interdependence), and formal agreements on common interests, responsibilities and obligations.

Neither culture nor structure are individually sufficient to explain democracy, or the behavior of democracies, because they interact with one another and each contributes to a larger syndrome that makes up democracy. Each is an important component to the *legitimacy* of the political system—a legitimacy which rests upon the same conditions that undergird Deutschian security communities. Also drawing upon the work of Deutsch, look at Jackman’s (1993, p.98) definition of legitimacy:

> A regime is thus legitimate to the extent that it can induce a measure of compliance from most people without resort to the use of physical force. The compliance need not be total, but it does need to be extensive.

As with security communities, in a legitimate system there are expectations of compliance, and expectations of the non-use of force. With such legitimacy, democracies can look at other democracies and see systems where norms against the use of force are important, and where governments are constrained by the societies they represent (through both norms and institutions).

These conditions obtain because, as in security communities, there is a ‘compatibility of political values associated with common political institutions...and links of social communication that reflect a sense of community and shared identity (‘we-feeling’) among the members, including mutual sympathy and loyalties’ (Kacowicz, 1995, p.2). The legitimacy of democracies also derives from the expectation of joint economic reward, one of the Deutschian preconditions for integration (Deutsch, et al. 1957). The legitimacy of integrated societies also includes the expectation that there will be a certain equity in the distribution of
economic benefits, and thus the narrowing of gaps between the richest and poorest in society (see Deutsch, 1977).

The transparency of democracies means that people inside and outside of the society can see how the political and economic systems work, that they can participate in those systems, and additionally expect some ‘fair’ mutual participation in the payoffs. Transparency involves, in part, the open movement of large amounts of information. It would be impossible for any form of free market system to work without very large amounts of information available to all participants, and potential participants, about supply, demand, prices, performance, etc. Of necessity, the information required by a free market moves unobstructedly in and out of society; it also moves freely within the society across its political and social systems, as well the economic system. The transparency required in a free market system thus reinforces the transparency inherent in a democratic political system.

This synergy has domestic (and international) consequences in that individuals and groups within a society can understand in what ways the economic system distributes its rewards/wealth/payoffs. When an economic (and political) system can provide positive outcomes for most participants—again, a condition of Deutschian integration—this too promotes societal legitimacy and community through the expectation of mutual rewards.

This synergy of political and economic transparency also creates conditions whereby democracies can draw upon ‘the shadow of the past’—and can tell that other polities are democracies. It permits and encourages transactions across state boundaries, promoting integration processes between democratic societies and states. If we are concerned with Kantian arguments of democratic norms, or the notion of common culture and values—then the values associated with legitimacy, and how they affect integration are important. If members of one democratic society with effective levels of legitimacy see another society with similar characteristics, then it would make no sense to fight a war. War would make no sense (returning to Mintz’s arguments), either as a mechanism to settle conflicts or as a mechanism to allocate values authoritatively (politics) or scarce resources (economics).

In an attempt to move the theory and analysis of the DPprop forward, I have tried in this essay to clarify a number of issues found in the writing on the

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16 ‘They’ clearly refers to the people living inside a democracy. But ‘they’ can also refer to large numbers of people living outside any particular democratic society, who, through a variety of transnational ties, participate in (and benefit from) economic, social, intellectual, and even political activities.

17 In a communication with the author, Steve Chan argues that it is only with the ‘shadow of the past’, that is, long and positive experience with each other, that leaders are willing to accept each other as doves, thereby running the risk of type-I error, mistaking an aggressive power as a status-quo one.
democratic peace. It is important to understand that the focus of the DPprop is on war, and that while it is important to explore the theories behind the DPprop in terms of their extension to other political phenomena, we must be careful in specifying exactly what these relationships should look like. Following earlier admonishments, I have attempted to clarify the concept of democracy and its relationship to theories of the DPprop by stressing the transparent nature of democracy. This aspect of democracy is of particular importance in regard to the need for mutual perceptions within a pair of democracies that the other is clearly a democracy.

This essay has also reconceptualised the democratic peace by indicating the various linkages the study of the DPprop has to integration theory. First, this is a useful way to demonstrate that although the DPprop presents a strong challenge to realist (and especially neorealist) models of international politics, it is not unique or radical in its challenge. Secondly, this perspective also allows us to understand that the DPprop fits within an integration framework, that it works according to processes already identified by integration theory, and that integration theory would permit us to synthesise rather easily a number of the 'contending' explanations of the DPprop. Third, regarding the question of how to extend explanations of the DPprop, and in which directions analysts should move, the linkages among integration theory, integration processes, and disintegration with the DPprop promise to be fertile areas. Russett, in discussions not of 'the democratic peace' but of a broader 'Kantian peace', has argued that the DPprop is only one leg of a triad that includes economic interdependence as well as international law and organisation. All three of the Kantian dimensions can be explored under a broader integration perspective.
References


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