More than two decades have passed since the end of the Cold War and a decade has passed since the events of 11 September 2001 largely transformed the meaning of 'international security'. Yet the United States' long-standing bilateral alliances with Australia and Japan - part of a US bilateral security network in the Asia-Pacific known as the 'San Francisco System', formed in an era when containing the Soviet Union and international communism was the major concern for American policymakers - remain viable. To remain so, however, they must be adaptable. In assessing America's alliances in Asia, the US Department of Defense's 2010 'Quadrennial Defense Review Report' observed that 'the regional and global security environments are more complex today ... [t]his emerging security landscape requires a more widely distributed and adaptive US presence in Asia that relies on and better leverages the capabilities of our regional allies and partners' (US Department of Defense 2010c: 59).

The intensification of strategic cooperation between Australia and Japan is a key to such adaptation at a time when the United States confronts a growing array of diverse security challenges with increasingly strained economic resources.

Other chapters in this volume examine the history of Australia–Japan security relations in some detail. Of concern here is how Japan and Australia, as the two key Pacific maritime allies of the United States, can effectively coordinate responses to the ongoing regional and global developments that are driving the long-term and monumental transitions now under way in Asia and internationally. More specifically,
Australia and Japan must collaborate in new areas of international security shaping joint policies for economic security, environmental security, nuclear non-proliferation, international counterterrorism, 'failed state' or 'rogue state' neutralisation and regional security architectures. They must do so while working with the United States to both deter and engage state-centric challengers – a rising China and a hostile North Korea. If they fail to achieve the essential levels of policy cohesion required to meet both traditional and emerging regional and international security threats, these threats will be sufficiently great that alliance fragmentation could emerge, seriously damaging each ally's future security outlook.

A brief review of how Australia and Japan have thus far enhanced their security coordination leads to the conclusion that the Asia-Pacific region is increasingly central in international security politics. Defining 'regional-global nexus' and evaluating regional and global security issues within the Australia–Japan security relationship is complicated (see Job 2007: 43–7). That a shift from regional to global emphases is taking place is widely acknowledged as the United States comes to terms with the Asia-Pacific region's centrality and as 'China's peaceful evolution' increasingly creates economic growth rates and diplomatic leverage commensurate with those of its rise to truly international status (Kilman 2011; Kurlantzick 2009). Following this brief review, analysis is offered on how Australia-Japan bilateral security cooperation has been institutionalised through joint diplomatic initiatives and operational ventures since the Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) of March 2007. The JDSC initiated the intensification of more systematic and formal cooperation between Canberra and Tokyo across a wide spectrum of traditional and non-traditional security components. Selected cases are reviewed to test the chapter's argument that sufficient Australian-Japanese policy cohesion exists to preclude alliance fragmentation. The current status of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) between Australia, Japan and the United States is also reviewed. The chapter concludes with an assessment of which key issue areas should be prioritised by Australian and Japanese security policy planners that would have both regional and global implications, and what policies could be adopted to meet these priorities.

Upgraded security cooperation

The US 'hub and spokes' system of bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific was forged during the early stages of the Cold War. It was
collaborate in new areas of international security, including economic security, environmental security, international counterterrorism, ‘failed states’ and regional security architectures. Working with the United States to both deter and discourage - a rising China and a hostile North Korea - the essential levels of policy cohesion between the United States and other regional and international stakeholders will be sufficiently great to allay fears of major reversion, seriously damaging each ally’s future prospects.

Australia and Japan have thus far enhanced their strategic relationship, leading to the conclusion that the Asia-Pacific region is an essential focus in international security politics. Defining and evaluating regional and global security policy cohesion between the United States and its Asia-Pacific centrality and as ‘China’s peaceful rise’ economic growth rates and diplomatic initiatives are acknowledged as the United States comes to retain, after that conflict’s demise, as a mechanism deemed capable of adapting to changing structural conditions such as China’s rising power, and in the absence of an established regional collective security mechanism (Acharya 2007: 22; Cha 2011: 30–1; Overholt 2008: 224). Within this general context, some analysts of regional security policy and politics have argued that ‘American dominance, based on the “hub-and-spokes” precepts of the [postwar] San Francisco System, are being sharply eroded by the rapid development of direct, mutually cooperative economic, cultural, and political ties among the “spoke states” that do not necessarily involve Washington at all’ (Calder and Ye 2010: 233). Japan’s and South Korea’s participation in the Trilateral Summit with China, and the establishment of a secretariat for that grouping in 2011, exemplify this trend as does Australia’s increased dependence on Chinese trade.

Another explanation for independent ‘spoke’ behaviour, however, posits less any collective desire by US regional allies to distance themselves from US power than to the need more effectively to complement a continuing American strategic presence in the region. As early as 1998, US Secretary of Defense William Cohen published an East Asia-Pacific strategy report that supported frameworks for discussion and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region beyond traditional bilateral relations. He noted that security pluralism in the form of subregional, minilateral, confidence-building efforts appeared to be particularly useful as a means of underwriting regional order building (Cohen 1998: 43). Taking this endorsement as a catalyst for more inter-spoke cooperation, the United States’ three major regional allies began exploring ways to consult and collaborate directly on issues of mutual concern.

Australian and Japanese security officials drew on such precedents as the United Nations (UN) collaboration in Cambodia during 1992 to 1993, joint deployments of military personnel to Timor-Leste in 1999 and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) guarding of Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) personnel at Al Muthana, Iraq, during 2003–05. They entered into regular bilateral consultations with their US counterparts at the vice ministerial level from 2002 onward. This step flowed from informal discussions between American, Australian and Japanese representatives to the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in Hanoi in July 2001 (Taylor and Ball 2007: 14–19; Wesley 2007: 49–50). Agendas for consultation discussions were shaped by common interests. These interests included both ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ security policy sectors at the global level.
level: combating terrorism, preserving maritime security and checking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The major impetus for such consultations was regional security, and, most notably, the growth of Chinese power and the intensification of a North Korean nuclear threat.

Why did the Australia-Japan security relationship emerge as the most prominent ‘web’ binding the US bilateral network’s spokes in the Asia-Pacific region? One explanation is that Australian and Japanese leaders were both seeking ways to respond to the United States’ obvious determination to have ‘similarly-minded alliance partners, who had recently aligned themselves very tightly to US global strategic policy’ (Bisley 2008: 40). Their national security interests also converged at both the global and regional levels. Japan was increasingly looking towards the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia as counterweights to rising Chinese predominance and North Korean nuclear politics. Australia viewed Japan and South Korea as potential ‘middle-power collaborators’ in its efforts to project economic and diplomatic influence beyond its traditional Southeast Asian and South Pacific domains.

Brian Job and Nick Bisley have both referred to such geopolitical concerns as the ‘centre of gravity’ phenomenon. Job observes that the ‘global’ centre of gravity may be shifting the bipolar international system during the Cold War and the unipolar system dominated by American power in its immediate aftermath. The shift is to one in which regions – particularly the Asia-Pacific – dominate the economic, military/political and cultural dynamics shaping world politics (Job 2007: 43). Asian wealth, growing Chinese power and a host of non-traditional security challenges (terrorism, pandemics, natural disasters and weapons proliferation) all illustrate this trend. In the case of Australia and Japan, the TSD provided a linkage to exploit. How significant such a linkage is within the overall international security framework is, however, debatable. The concurrent tendency for the linkages to reinforce existing bilateral security arrangements and to contribute to their adaptability, however, has clearly strengthened Australian and Japanese perceptions that their own security interests have been enhanced by strengthened linkages.

The TSD was upgraded to the level of ministerial consultations in March 2006 when US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso met in Sydney with Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer. Prior to their meeting, speculation was rampant that Rice was intent on using the TSD as a forum to contain
preserving maritime security and checking use of mass destruction (WMD). The major issue was regional security, and, most notably, the intensification of a North Korean security relationship emerge as the most serious global strategic policy' (Bisley 2007b: 2).

Particular emphasis was directed towards preventing the spread of WMD, strengthening counter-terrorism and addressing human security concerns. Non-traditional security deliberations and procedures then became the TSD's preoccupation of choice, with such activities as the Pacific Global Air Mobility Seminar designed to enhance the allies' collective ability to respond to humanitarian disasters. This gravitation towards non-traditional security planning and capabilities was exemplified by the three countries' successful coordination of disaster relief efforts as members of the 'Core Group' (along with India) in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.

By the middle of 2008, Rice acceded to the TSD, emphasising humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (S. Smith 2008). This accession may be attributed, in part, to the failure of the so-called 'Quadrilateral Initiative' proposed by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in early 2007 to be manifested by joint (Malabar) naval exercises involving Australian, Indian, Japanese, US and Singaporean forces in the Bay of Bengal during August. Towards the end of the year, the Initiative had lost its impetus with a new Australian government opposing it, the Indian government backtracking in the face of Chinese pressure and an increasing number of US policy planners concluding that any such 'league of democracies' was too provocative towards Beijing. The Abe government fell in August and its successor quietly shelved the idea (Brewster 2010: 3–4).

The TSD's orientation towards coordinating global security politics between the three allies appeared to be a more natural function. US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, underscored this following the December 2007 TSD meeting in Canberra, noting that regional defence planning had not been a central element of the discussions (Auslin 2008: 18). It appeared that Japan and Australia needed to look elsewhere for institutionalising their bilateral defence collaboration. The JDSC appeared capable of filling the gap.
Institutionalising bilateral and trilateral security collaboration

The ensuing years have featured several trends in Australia–Japan security relations that were unanticipated when the JDSC was released. Changes of government in all three countries have ushered in new and unanticipated challenges to the sustainability of US–Japan and Australia–Japan bilateral defence relations. The complexity and diversity of these challenges have arguably reduced the visibility (if not the substance) of Australia–Japan bilateral defence ties and TSD coordination since the initial flurry of activity in 2006 and 2007. China’s growing power and non-traditional security challenges such as the massive tsunami and earthquake which decimated Japan in March 2011, however, have ensured that bilateral and trilateral security ties between Australia, Japan and the United States continue to be of central relevance.

Progress in developing Australia–Japan security relations occurred with the signing of an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in May 2010. Negotiations on reaching an Information Security Agreement to improve the two countries’ defence interoperability have also advanced. These developments have evolved notwithstanding the Australian Labor government’s assault on Japanese whaling activities in the southern ocean soon after it assumed office in late 2007. Further, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s vision of realising an ‘Asia-Pacific Community’ diverged from that advanced by Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama after his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was elected to office in August 2009 (Cook and Wilkins 2011: 8).

Australian–American security ties remained strong under Rudd’s tenure of office and that of his successor, Julia Gillard. US–Japan security ties became more strained when various DPJ factions and minority parties affiliated with the government pushed Hatoyama to demand that a long-standing military basing dispute with the Americans – the timing and means of removing US forces from an Okinawa air base – be resolved. A removal agreement had actually been signed between the preceding Japanese government and the George W. Bush administration in 2006 but the DPJ government had come under fire to repudiate that arrangement. These tensions were further exacerbated by American suspicions that the DPJ wanted Japan to move closer to China at US expense.

Hatoyama’s resignation in June 2010 effectively removed the Okinawa issue from the centre of Japanese foreign policy and at least temporarily
Regional Security

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modified alliance tensions with Washington. It was relegated to the
political backburner in the aftermath of the 11 March 2011 Tohoku
earthquake and ensuing tsunami that destroyed much of the Pacific
coastline of Japan's northern islands, killed thousands of residents and
triggered nuclear power plant meltdowns. This disaster impelled the
United States, Australia and many other countries to provide extensive
humanitarian relief using both military and civilian assets.

ACSA was signed at a joint foreign and defence ministerial meeting
convened in Tokyo (also known as the '2+2' meeting). This setting
appears to be the preferred venue for the Australian and Japanese
governments to announce new and far-reaching bilateral initiatives.1
Some observers may regard this accord as more symbolic than substan­
tive, given the low probability of Australian forces being deployed in
Japan prior to the latter's bases incurring North Korean or Chinese
strike in a future all-out war in the Northeast Asian theatre. It does, however, implement an important principle of enhanced mili­
tary logistical interoperability between US regional allies or 'spokes' in
the Asia-Pacific (Cook and Wilkins 2011: 3).2 It provides for the recip­
rocal provision of supplies and services for joint military exercises and
training, peacekeeping operations and both humanitarian and disaster
relief operations.

Although the Japanese Diet had not yet formally reviewed ACSA
prior to the Tohoku earthquake, there is little doubt about its appli­
cability for such future contingencies. It could also be applied to other
ongoing operations involving ADF and SDF personnel, including peace­
building activities in Timor-Leste, humanitarian assistance in Pakistan
and counter-piracy surveillance in the Gulf of Aden (Gillard 2011). One
Japanese military observer has noted that ACSA is 'a significant step
forward in SDF-ADF cooperation. It dispenses with ad hoc, case-by-case
negotiation and coordination, which is sometimes impossible due to
time constraints imposed by the need for action' (Ikematsu 2011).3

Japan is gradually stepping up its involvement in Australian and
allied military operations and exercises as part of the JDSC's emphasis
on greater bilateral strategic collaboration and force interoperability.
In August 2008, for example, it announced it would dispatch civilian
officials and experts to Solomon Islands as a contribution to the
Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands. This was
a practical implementation of an agreement struck by the two coun­
tries' prime ministers, during a meeting in June, to upgrade Japanese
politic-seeurology involvement in the South Pacific (Ishihara 2009: 117;
Sheridan 2008). As two key maritime powers, Japan and Australia have
long patrolled intersecting sea lines of communication in the East and South China Seas and have coordinated electronic data links for sharing information during these operations (Simon 2011: 2). In July 2011, the Japanese Maritime SDF deployed the destroyer, Shimakaze, to conduct joint drills with an American destroyer and a Royal Australian Navy patrol boat as part of an international fleet review in Brunei (Agence France-Presse 2011). The significance of such a development could not have escaped Chinese policy planners as China moves to intensify its own territorial claims within and influence over the South China Sea. Nearly simultaneously, Japanese F-15 fighters conducted the first ever SDF–ADF joint air combat exercise with Australian F-A/18 Hornet aircraft as part of a month-long drill led by the US Air Force in Alaska (Breitbar 2011).

These initiatives suggest the widening array of opportunities that Australia and Japan have to collaborate militarily in both ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ security sectors. These include defending energy supplies and commercial interests, deterring potential state-centric and human security threats and responding to increased US reliance on allied capabilities at a time when the American economy is increasingly straining Washington’s ability to maintain customary levels of defense spending (Cook and Wilkins 2011: 10). They also reflect a mutual determination by Australian and Japanese defense planners to develop and project more robust strategic postures and defense capabilities, individually and with each other. Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper points to the 2008 Australia–Japan Memorandum on Defence Cooperation as underscoring the two countries mutual strategic interests and their intent to develop and coordinate their practical defense cooperation (Department of Defence, Australia 2009: 95). Japan’s new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG, approved by the Japanese government’s cabinet in December 2010) envisions that country developing a ‘dynamic defense force’ by, among other things, ‘strengthen[ing] its cooperation with the Republic of Korea and Australia’ (Ministry of Defense, Japan 2010c: 8). Japan and Australia have elected to avoid either a globally oriented security approach focused on intermittent participation in UN or other international peacekeeping ventures or exclusively regional defense postures. They have instead embraced a more holistic approach to contemporary regional and international security, reconciling both global and regional security initiatives. This approach is embodied in an action plan to implement the JDSC that was approved by both governments ‘to enhance policy coordination on security issues in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond’ by working
With the UN and regional organisations to modify future crises and respond to non-traditional security contingencies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2009b).

The TSD’s recent evolution has embodied the same outlook and its adherents have underscored that grouping’s flexibility as its greatest asset (see, for example, Rudd 2010b; Campbell 2011). Having no formal secretariat or infrastructure, the TSD can facilitate relatively spontaneous ministerial-level dialogues in response to rapidly evolving regional security challenges. As Rudd recently observed, ‘[t]here are no fixed timetables for meetings – we meet as convenient opportunities present themselves. It is responsive to the needs of the partners, with working groups or forums being stood up as required and phased out when no longer needed’ (Rudd 2010b). Indeed, no formal TSD meetings at the full ministerial level have been held since September 2009 when one was convened on the sidelines of a UN General Assembly meeting.

However, senior official meetings under TSD auspices have occurred regularly, involving officials at the deputy ministerial level. One such meeting in July 2011 in Washington, for example, generated wide-ranging discussion on ‘a range of pressing global issues including the situation in the Middle East and North Africa and Asia-Pacific regional architecture’ (Embassy of the United States, Canberra 2011).

This trilateral process of consultation and functional cooperation is by now well established. Critics of this process focus on what they regard as an undue and confusing proliferation of ‘minilateral’ bodies in the Asia-Pacific, such as the TSD, unaccompanied by visible or enduring policy impact. Evan Feigenbaum from the US Council on Foreign Relations argues regional security actors should ‘avoid geometry for its own sake. Form should follow function, and any multilateral group in Asia is more likely to be effective if it assembles those with the greatest power and capacity and has a clear, agreed purpose.’ Applying this criterion, he concludes, the 2004 Tsunami Core Group (involving Australia, India, Japan and the United States) ‘lack a clear and compelling purpose and are weakened by overlapping and redundant memberships’ (Felgenbaum 2011). However, this represents a minority view. Most American and allied policymakers and independent observers view trilateralism and minilateralism as a constructive way for security partners and other like-minded states in the Asia-Pacific to strike a judicious balance between timely crisis response and longer-term institutional cultivation. They do so without being encumbered
with more formal mechanisms underpinning, and often complicating, more conventional security relations.

**Facing the future**

Efforts by the Australian and Japanese ‘spokes’ of the San Francisco System to strengthen their own bilateral security relations will hinge significantly on how effectively US policymakers manage their own country's strategic interests and behaviour in the Asia-Pacific (as noted by Ball 2006b). The Barack Obama administration's ongoing review of its Asia-Pacific strategy is being shaped by several key postulates: maintaining its strategic presence in the region under an increasingly austere national budget crisis; responding to China's ‘anti-access’ strategy to threaten US regional-basing operations and global command, control and intelligence systems; and expanding multidimensional and multilayered cooperation with regional security partners and friends. Japan's NDPG and Australia's recently initiated (June 2011) Defence Force Posture Review both acknowledge the geographic factors influencing force deployment and basing and greater integration of allied force planning and capabilities (relevant assessments include Barker 2011; Berkofsky 2011). Over the next few years, these common concerns will provide impetus for American and Japanese policy planners to resolve the politically volatile basing issue on Okinawa. Similarly, Australia must consider shifting its military assets to the country's north and northwest access points to help maintain stability in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. Sustained or intensified Japanese and Australian missile defence research under US direction must be undertaken to neutralise future missile strikes against allied targets (Barker 2011; Ennis 2011; Klinger 2011).

In 2006, the respected Australian strategic analyst Desmond Ball observed that what had become a comprehensive defence connection between Australia and Japan was shaped by relatively surreptitious and bureaucratic processes. He called for a major public debate in both countries to examine the implications flowing from their growing security connection (Ball 2006b). Since 2006, however, the scope and depth of the two countries' security-related collaboration has expanded substantially, verifying its legitimacy. Australia's extensive interdependent trading ties with Northeast Asia counter any argument that instability or war in that region would not render massive damage to the Australian economy. Japan's plodding, but enduring, democratic political system and its readiness to work with Australia on such key issues
Regional Security

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ess to work with Australia on such key issues
as WMD, non-proliferation, climate change and regional order building
underwrite the two countries' propensity to collaborate on regional and
global security. This is self-evident to most of Canberra's political lead­
ership and Australia's public at large. A poll gauging Australians' feel­
ings towards other countries published in mid-2011 showed that 67 per
cent of Australians had favourable perceptions of Japan while only 53
per cent held favourable views towards China (Hanson 2011: 6). This
reality is that Australia and China have yet to reconcile fundamental
political and cultural differences over human rights and political values
that are largely absent in ties between Australia and Japan.

The relevance of Australian-Japanese bilateralism acknowledged, are
critics such as Feigenbaum correct in their insistence that minilateral
initiatives such as the TSD muddle rather than facilitate regional archi­
tecture building in Asia? There are several persuasive counterarguments
to this view. First, the TSD has served as a precedent for Japan and the
United States, in particular, to strengthen politico-diplomatic consulta­
tions and, where appropriate, calibrated defence collaboration at both
the bilateral and trilateral levels with other key regional security players
such as India and South Korea. For example, an India-Japan-US trilat­
eral dialogue on such regional and global issues as counterterrorism,
maritime security, energy and various regional flashpoints (i.e., the
South China Sea and the Korean peninsula) was announced following
Indian Foreign Minister Nirupama Rao’s visit to Tokyo in early April
2011 (Yomiuri Shimbun 2011b; Jagranfosh 2011). This low-key process is
less likely to provoke a negative response by an always vigilant China
compared to the more provocative Malabar naval exercises previously
conducted by these countries with Australia and Singapore. Trilateral
US-Japan-South Korea deliberations have eased differences between
Tokyo and Seoul on how to approach the Six-Party Talks and to coor­
dinate responses to an increasingly threatening North Korea (Kim
2011).

Second, the predominantly consultative nature of the TSD and other
trilaterals/minilateral where Australia and Japan are active allows for
the prioritisation of consensus building in 'niche areas' of power rela­
tions and (more frequently) non-traditional security (Soeya 2007: 88).
Indeed, the TSD affiliates have already demonstrated their awareness of
how such consensus building could facilitate trilateralism's relevance
to Asia-Pacific confidence building. In a joint statement following the
September 2009 TSD ministerial meeting, initiatives in humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief were highlighted as key areas of future
TSD emphasis (Smith 2009b). This conforms to Feigenbaum's model
of applying minilateralism to ‘discrete and imminent’ crises and of downplaying geopolitics in the process of overcoming them. However, it also gives middle powers a framework from which to initiate and pursue more traditional strategic cooperation between themselves and with their mutual great and powerful American ally if they were to face common threats requiring such policy coordination.

Third, ongoing minilateral consultations provide an unspectacular but substantive alternative model to recent and unsuccessful ventures for regional community building such as Australia’s Asia-Pacific community proposal or Japan’s East Asia community counterpart that relies upon the politics of ‘grand design’. The traditional US proclivity for relating to Asia-Pacific security politics via its perpetuation of the ‘competitive geometry’ represented by the San Francisco System can only be modified through adapting that framework to the forces of regional structural change that are gradually reorienting Asia-Pacific geopolitics away from postwar asymmetrical security politics and towards more distinct multilateral frameworks. The TSD and similar instrumentalities can function as useful ‘building blocks’ for reconciling traditional American preferences for bilateral approaches to more multilateral and regionally indigenous architectures. As previously intimated, at least some American policy planners have recognised that such a transition is taking place and have proposed specific means for Washington to accommodate this trend. The recent US accession into the East Asia Summit and the Obama administration’s decision to appoint an ambassador to ASEAN and to convene annual summits with that organisation provide further evidence of the United States’ recognition that it needs to accommodate multilateralism’s ascendancy in the region. This recognition is, notwithstanding, how weak it perceives those regional institutions may be.

Conclusion

The recent intensification of domestic political challenges in both Australia and Japan – the former is wrestling with the costs of addressing climate change while the latter is still reeling from the effects of the natural disasters that tore much of the nation apart in March 2011 – render their coordination of responses to formidable regional and international security policies even more challenging. It is clear, however, that both countries are determined to build on their growing legacy of strategic collaboration, both in their capacity as ‘independent spokes’ within the existing US alliance framework and as effective partners...
with the United States in shaping new mechanisms for meeting future security challenges.

Australia, in particular, is strongly positioned to exert middle-power diplomacy in ways that could help 'enmesh' China into a more harmonious relationship with Japan and the United States. It does not share the historical baggage and territorial grievances that impede greater Sino-Japanese cooperation. It lacks the material power of the United States which China still regards as threatening to its own security interests when Washington chooses to exert it. Australia’s challenge is to move judiciously towards refining key security commitments to its Japanese and American allies while simultaneously maintaining open and vigorous economic and political relations with China. These would be inherently more comprehensive and more geopolitically salient than anything currently underwriting bilateral Sino-Australian security relations. Any such development would undoubtedly enhance prospects for greater regional and international stability.

Notes

1. As noted by Australian Prime Minister Gillard on 22 April 2011. Gillard forewarned that a future 2+2 session would announce a comprehensive joint vision for future Australia-Japan defence cooperation. Australia conducts 2+2 meetings with only three other countries: the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan (Gillard 2011).

2. For relevant background on evolving Chinese strategies to deny the United States or other allies the use of Japanese bases during future regional contingencies, see Yoshihara (2010).

3. For the full text of ACSA, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (2010a).

4. Outgoing Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara noted that during his late November 2010 visit, he worked to organise the next session of the TSD. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (2011b).

5. The United States registered a 70 per cent favourable rating, trailing New Zealand with 85 per cent and Great Britain with 79 per cent.

6. This meeting occurred on the sidelines of the ARF meetings at Bali.

7. One of the earliest instances of such recognition was analysis offered by Blair and Hanley (2001). Blair had just resigned from his position as commander-in-chief of the US Pacific Command just prior to this article’s publication. A more recent but definitive US statement on assigning greater priority to multilateralism can be found in Clinton (2010b).