Chapter 11
Asian Approaches to Human Security
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More than a decade since the United Nations convened its ‘Millennium summit’ in September 2000, the credibility of ‘human security’ as an approach to Asia-Pacific stability remains tenuous. The two core human security principles – ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ – are being tested by global economic forces and international strategic developments in ways that clearly challenge their relevance to greater Asia. The intensification of great power rivalry between China and the United States is combining with the aftereffects of the global financial crisis to render the struggles of individual Asians in such areas as human rights, forced migration, health, famine and environmental degradation less important to Asian security politics than more traditional, state-centric preoccupations with sovereignty control, territorial purview and military balances. Certainly, human security dialogues remain prominent between regional actors and within various regional instrumentalities. Human security-related actions such as the disaster relief efforts which were implemented after the Indian Ocean tsunami in late 2004, and following the ‘triple tragedy’ that hit Japan in March 2011, are noteworthy. Yet, two fundamental conclusions reached by a definitive UNESCO study released in 2004 on East Asian frameworks for promoting human security seem at least as applicable now: most Asians remain tied to the concept that ‘it is an individual sovereign nation’s own duty to secure its citizens’ physical safety’ and Asians remain largely opposed to human security postulates that they regard as originating from extra-regional values (Lee 2004: 37-8, emphasis in original).

However, different analysts, both within and outside the region, would contest this observation. Insisting that human security can be viewed as a ‘distinctive notion’ within Asia, Amitav Acharya observes that it ‘resonates’ with such regional ideas as ‘comprehensive security’ and ‘cooperative security’ which relate directly to the national security and economic development concerns of Asian states – although human security is more ‘people-centred’ and ‘needs-based’ than comprehensive security (Acharya 2001). Tsunao Akaha argues that human security is gradually being ‘institutionalised’ through regional consultative dialogues (such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] and its action programmes) and through regional actors’ increasing systematic interaction with extra-regional parties and global organisations (Akaha 2009; see also Sritwongse and Bunbongkarn 2001). Other authors have observed that ‘functional’ components – development politics, drug-trafficking, cyber-crime and sustainable development – are related to more politically sensitive issues such as human rights, democratic
governance and ethnic conflict, thus forming coherent human security policy agendas. Such observers also contend that the traditional concerns of Asian policy elites for achieving state-centric security and national prosperity are gradually being complemented – or supplanted – by a greater willingness to acknowledge and confront ‘life-damaging issues’ (Umegaki 2008: 7–8; Burke 2001).

It is argued here, however, that notwithstanding how honourable the sentiments driving such human security-centric observations may be, they are largely misplaced in an Asian security context. The core of the human security idea – to emphasise the importance of individuals and communities as the appropriate object and beneficiary of security analysis and policy – remains compelling. Yet, such observers as Roland Paris and Edward Newman are on solid ground when they note that the human security concept is often so generalised and so elastic that all potential issues of concern are ‘securitised’ in ways that the systematic prioritisation of both human security problems and their solutions remains highly elusive.1 Asian policymakers in particular are largely uncomfortable with the human security paradigm, instead favouring clearly demarcated policy objectives and tangible means–ends strategies to realise their basic security objectives. Even the redoubtable diplomatic style of ASEAN member-states – commonly known as the ‘ASEAN way’ – has been grounded in state-centric norms as evidenced by the policy approaches of their primary instrument for generating regional security dialogues – the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (see Nishikawa 2010: 128–9; Anwar 2003). The Asian financial crisis and 11 September 2001 only briefly created openings for human security norms to penetrate ASEAN deliberations. These have since been overridden by state-centric preoccupations such as the rise of China, concerns about the Korean peninsula and ongoing territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas (Cheeppensook 2007).2

This does not mean that human-centric security approaches have virtually no place in Asia’s security politics. Indeed, a major concern of this chapter is to what extent we can ‘find the right fit’ for human-centric security approaches within the

1 Paris (2001: 92) notes that this is the case ‘because of the broad sweep and definitional elasticity of most formulations of human security but also – and perhaps even more problematically – because the proponents of human security are typically reluctant to prioritize the jumble of goals and principles that make up the concept’. Newman (2010: 82) observes that ‘[h]uman security is normatively attractive, but analytically weak. Through a broad human security lens, anything that presents a critical threat to life and livelihood is a security threat, whatever the source. If individual security is the dependent variable, then it is possible to identify and codify every physiological threat. But this would be of little use, as it would generate an unmanageable array of variables’.

2 Kasira Cheeppensook is optimistic that ‘human-centric’ norms are gradually penetrating the ‘ASEAN way’ but admits that state-centric security norms still predominate. Singling out Thailand as a potential spearhead for leading the transition from state-centric to human-centric norm orientation, the author could not have been aware of how seriously Thailand’s own domestic politics would constrain Bangkok from assuming such a role during the two years subsequent to the paper’s presentation.
Asia-Pacific's dominant state-centric security paradigm. It is asserted here that doing so is critical for realising the region's stability. In the absence of such a 'fit', the peoples and states of the region are destined to remain mired within a narrow and highly neo-realist framework of unremitting regional crises and relentless state-centric competition. Such rivalries will intensify even while global security challenges are intensifying the imperative for regional states to diversify their security postures and readjust their strategic capabilities.

Human security is relevant to Asia-Pacific security dynamics because it offers policy options for dealing with an ever expanding and diverse array of regional security challenges. Even if regional security elites continue to be dominated by state-centric security preoccupations, normative imperatives and fundamental human deprivations are sufficiently numerous and compelling to warrant consideration of how Asia-Pacific governments can better serve the basic needs of their citizens (in Bangladesh, for example, which hardly faces any external military threats, but where millions of people die of preventable disease). Such consideration is appropriate even if human security approaches cannot assume immediate core status within regional states' traditional national security planning.

The analysis that follows considers how this policy dichotomy can be reconciled by evaluating three relevant aspects of human-centric and state-centric security integration. Initially it briefly reviews the tension generated by the co-existence of two competitive security approaches in contemporary Asian security politics. It then applies the key generalisations we derive about this policy tension by briefly reviewing two 'cases' relating to the short-range stability of the Asia-Pacific security environment: North Korea, and the 'arc of crisis'. Both cases focus on states that confront immense and incessant non-traditional security challenges. North Korea, in particular, is a 'high profile' case because it figures so prominently in the traditional strategic calculations of other regional actors. It needs to be examined for no other reason than it provides a bellwether for the extent to which human security politics can be effective within the broader Asia-Pacific security environment.

A concluding section offers some views on the feasibility of realising an appropriate 'nexus' between human security and state-centric security politics in the Asia-Pacific.

Traditional Security Versus Human Security: Understanding Incongruities

Human security discourse in Asia has been shaped by contradictory developmental and human rights concerns. Many developing states in Asia are still coming to terms with their own national identity after centuries of colonial tutelage or occupation by outside powers. This causes most Asia-Pacific states to look at the world through 'realist' lenses and generally to prioritise the 'national interest' over the rights and welfare of the individuals. The 'Asian values' concept that was projected by various Asian elites during the 1990s and prior to the 1997–1998...
New Approaches to Human Security in the Asia-Pacific

Asian financial crisis was viewed by many as ranking collective order and social harmony over personal freedom and questioning the relevance of Western 'liberal democratic values' to their own region's cultures and state-building processes (Milner 2002). Most Western states have, conversely, moved beyond this stage of politico-economic evolution. They are, particularly in the aftermath of the Cold War, more liable to 'put people first' when conceptualising the nature and scope of security threats (Buzan 1983). In this context, state mechanisms of Asian political systems actually threaten those over whom they would govern by 'securitising' the power and resources needed to check anyone who would challenge their political legitimacy and authority.

Any tendency to view and treat human security as the opposite to traditional, state-centric security is not necessarily due to an inherent contradiction in the two paradigms. The human security story as it has developed in Asia over the past 15 years underscores this point. The Asian financial crisis and the more recent global financial crisis have reinforced the fundamental truth that Asian states cannot insulate their own economies or polities from the larger structural forces and powerful agents of change in today's world. After 1997, inclinations to demarcate state-centric and human-centric approaches began to soften as Asian political and intellectual elites such as Obuchi Keizō, Kim Dae-jung, Yamamoto Tadashi and Surin Pitsuwan began to embrace selected human security components. As Paul Evans (2004: 269) has since recalled:

Beyond being a nice-sounding phrase, human security provided a tool for acknowledging that even two decades of [Asian] economic growth and state-building had not eliminated severe vulnerabilities for large numbers of Asians. And it at least hinted at the growing role of nonstate actors as (1) alternative service providers when states were unable to provide social welfare and protection for their own citizens, and (2) participants in the policy process.

Assimilation of the human security concept by such regional institutions as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the East Asia Summit (EAS) has been evident. So too has the view that traditional 'hard power' assets such as military capabilities must be used in response to regional crises. The deployment of military forces to those areas affected by the Indian Ocean tsunami in late 2004, for example, has led in recent years to the conduct of disaster relief exercises within the US regional alliance system while coastguards and national police forces are now collaborating across the region to stem the flow of illegal migration, drug trade and piracy (see Tarumi 2010; NTS Alert 2009, 2010).

In a similar vein, large East Asian powers such as China and Japan are coming under increased international pressure to become more involved in humanitarian relief operations in Africa and parts of Asia. Such demands emanate from the...
increasing acceptance of the 'responsibility to protect' (R2P) as an international norm. As one of its most prominent advocates describes it, R2P is about initially preventing conflict within as well as between sovereign disputants and, if conflict is unavoidable, then about applying a host of reactive responses (not just military actions) to realise conflict reduction and eventual conflict resolution. It involves a wide range of actors and not just those able and willing to apply coercive military forces (Evans 2012). However, East Asian powers have responded with only qualified and relatively nuanced policy adjustments. China has 'softened' its previously uncompromising stance on opposing humanitarian intervention. Japan has clearly opted to support forms of humanitarian relief and intervention that it believes will maximise its need to contribute hard power (the use of military force) (Prantl and Nakano 2011). An illustration of this trend is characterised as facilitating 'resilience' in the human security paradigm by developing 'the capacity to positively or successfully adapt to external problems or threats'. Situated in what one analyst has labelled a 'post-interventionist paradigm', threatened individuals, weak states or other potential benefactors of human security must then be expected to build material and normative capacities to neutralise future human security challenges rather than be invariably reliant on external intervention. This is appropriate to the Japanese human security approach and conducive to responding effectively to Chinese ambiguities about 'when to intervene and why' (Chandler 2012).4

The large number of issues that have been subsumed under the general 'human security' rubric have tended to obscure rather than clarify human security's regional credibility. In the absence of widespread regional consensus about human security's meaning and relevance, the gap between those supporting state-centric approaches and those balking more human-centric orientations has actually widened. How to distinguish between the two approaches has become blurred. This is particularly true in the area of humanitarian intervention. As Dewi Fortuna Anwar has observed, the region appears to be deeply divided on the question of allowing external forces to intervene in humanitarian crises. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and human rights activists generally endorse such intervention and a few Asian governments, such as Thailand and the Philippines, have supported 'constructive intervention' in the form of collective regional action against the worst violations of human rights and in the face of unmitigated human disaster. Most ASEAN members, however, have remained relatively steadfast in opposing outside interference to domestic affairs—although such resistance has weakened in some instances (Indonesian criticism of Malaysian political opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim's arrest in 1998, more recent disaster relief operations which have involved foreign personnel and...

4 David Chandler was writing at least in partial response to Mary Martin's and Taylor Owen's argument that human security 'has all but vanished' from the contemporary international security discourse, largely supplanted by the 'responsibility to protect' concept (Chandler 2012: 215). See also Martin and Owen (2010).
technology conducted in China following earthquakes and floods and the Chinese/Japanese postures regarding the 'responsibility to protect') (Anwar 2003: 556–9).

Many Asian policymakers would agree with Chandler’s critique of the human security agenda – that human security approaches have actually been integrated into policymaking to the extent that many governments believe that ‘individuals, values and emancipatory theory’ muddles policymaking clarity. Such confusion renders the world ‘less open to strategic intervention’ and justifies policymakers’ adoption of state-centric-oriented approaches (Chandler 2008: 437–8). Paris has levelled a similar criticism about human security’s relevance to policy formulation, noting that lacking a precise definition, human security becomes ‘extraordinarily expansive and vague, encompassing everything from physical security to psychological well-being’ (Paris 2001: 88; for an Asian perspective, see Liu 2006; for a perspective on the ‘ambiguity policy strategy’, see Prantl and Nakano 2011).

One way to overcome this tendency is to tailor the scope of such muddling to fit the priorities and requirements of policymakers. This may fit the nation-building orientations of various Asian policy elites. It may also preclude comprehensive understanding of regional insecurities in the context of strongly held ‘Asian values’ (Liu 2006: 88 commenting on Thomas and Tow 2002 and Bellamy and McDonald 2002). An alternative approach would be to develop a ‘distinctive’ regional approach to human security based on its philosophical heritage, political values and material interests. This could be realised through the gradual development of an ‘Eastphalian order’ that harmonises the pre-eminence of sovereignty and collective interest with selective application of individual rights and normative standards (S.W. Kim 2010). Epistemic communities, already active in the institutionalisation of such Asian architectures as the EAS and ASEAN, might be commissioned to identify points of convergence between state-centric and human-centric security approaches and ways to exploit their complementarity. 6

Both state-centric and human-centric security paradigms highlight conflict prevention (whether between states or individuals). Both focus on reducing vulnerability (from other threatening powers or from those within a state who threaten individuals’ well-being). Both are concerned with community-building in a broader, global context. Both envision some form of collective security as a means of overcoming aggression, either by ethnic or political groups against weaker parties or against a state (Tow and Trood 2000: 22–4).

The question remains, however, as to who can advance security. Universalist and regional institutions are dependent on their member-states. If groups of individuals claim they can provide for their own security they are merely claiming the sovereign prerogative and ability to do so – the fundamental characteristic

5 China requested foreign assistance after the Sichuan earthquake in 2008. The United States and Russia provided emergency supplies through transport planes, Japan provided search-and-rescue and medical teams, South Korea and Singapore provided additional search-and-rescue personnel and Indonesia sent medical supplies. See Hays (2008).

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of a state. Developments shaping the Asian regional landscape over the past two
decades reinforce this hard reality. The inability of nascent regional security
institutions such as the ARF to stabilise the South China Sea or the Malacca Strait
has been illustrative. So too was the essential state-centric regional response —
the formation of ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) — to the Asian
financial crisis. Perhaps the most graphic example of sovereign predominance
in the regional security environment is China's rise, engineered through central
state planning, as one of the world's foremost economic and military powers. That
country's formidable natural disasters and pandemics appear to be mere blips on a
much broader screen of a truly formidable state-centric actor projecting incessant
growth and increasing prominence within a world order still largely shaped by
sovereign control of material resources.

The fundamental question as to what degree human security approaches can be
integrated into traditional national security planning remains largely unanswered in
an Asia-Pacific context. One way to test this conundrum is by case study analysis.

Case Studies Analyses

To measure the inter-relationship between human security and national security,
cases must be identified where they have intersected and affected each other.
Two such cases are presented here: North Korea, and the so-called 'arc of crisis'
that encompasses part of Indonesia, and most of Melanesia and other geographic
locales in the 'wider Pacific' that are capable of generating crises that attract
the concern of the Asia-Pacific's larger powers. In both cases, state-centric security
approaches that rely on military power are seen as prominent instruments for
managing peace and stability. Human security politics, however, is arguably a
complement, and an alternative, to managing security politics in both cases. In the
Korean peninsula, traditional strategies of deterrence and diplomacy projected by
the region's two major powers (China and the United States) could fail, leading to
wide-scale conflict in which the dynamics of human security become increasingly
central. The occurrence of flooding and famine, and the plight of North Korean
refugees are already well-known human security components associated with
North Korea. The survival of North Korea's population in the face of weapons of
mass destruction use would be a paramount human security concern. In the wider
'southern Pacific', the 'responsibility to protect' has become synonymous with
Australian and New Zealand peacekeeping ventures in Timor-Leste, Bougainville,
Solomon Islands and other Melanesian crisis points. Large powers such as China
and Japan have joined Australia, New Zealand and the United States in concerns
about the ramifications of arc of crisis 'failed states' economic deprivation, climate
change effects and other human security-related threats.

The research question that this chapter addresses is whether human security
intersects or must intersect with traditional national security concerns in Asian
security politics. The case studies can be applied to test these propositions by
comparing two key variables: (1) the extent to which human security measures are or could be more effective in modifying repressive state-centric behaviour that violates fundamental human security criteria (freedom from fear and freedom from want) than traditional or national security-related hardline postures such as sanctions or deterrence; and (2) the degree to which external powers’ competing geopolitical interests facilitate or minimize prospects for coordinating effective policy responses to repressive regime behaviour. Comparing these two factors complies with the ‘structured focused comparison’ method of assessing a research question. By applying this method, key ‘causal chains’ and outcomes that influence the balance of human security and national security can be identified and hopefully provide some clues for better policy management of intersection of the two security approaches (George and Bennett 2005: 67–72). 7

North Korea

Critics of traditional national security policy’s applicability to contemporary international relations earmark North Korea as arguably the most graphic example of a country where power balancing, deterrence, tit-for-tat strategies and other traditional security approaches have failed to remedy a major regional instability. Despite the outside world extending massive food and energy assistance to keep the Kim family’s regime afloat, North Korean policymakers have developed and tested nuclear weapons, spent one-quarter of their country’s total gross national product on maintaining one of the world’s largest armies, conducted intermittent and violent attacks against South Korean politicians, military units and civilians and engaged in such illicit acts as smuggling, money laundering, counterfeiting and drug trafficking. Traditional state-centric responses to such provocations, including sanctions, military exercises and hard diplomatic bargaining, have proven to be unsuccessful in reforming North Korea’s ‘rogue state’ behaviour.

Those more inclined to apply human security approaches towards North Korea debate the comparative utility of trying to hold its rulers accountable to international norms of human rights and humanitarianism as opposed to focusing primarily on the survival of the North Korean population. The latter school of thought prioritizes the survival objective even if this means working reluctantly with a North Korean government known to cipher off substantial amounts of development assistance to other sectors than those programmes’ originally intended targets (see Feffer 2010). 8 Either of these policy directions tend to downplay the value of applying ‘sticks’ and demonstrating resolve against North Korean provocations — such as its alleged sinking of the South Korean naval corvette, the Cheonan, in March 2010

7 A critique of this method is offered by Drozdova and Gaubatz (2010).
8 For a defence of the human rights/humanitarian approach to human security as it relates to North Korea, see Cohen (2010).
Asian Approaches to Human Security

Asian-Pacific

...in favour of conditioning longer-term North Korean behaviour toward becoming less isolationist and bellicose toward the outside world.

The levels to which state-centric and human-centric security outlooks intersect in the North Korean case seem to be determined by two key factors: (1) the unlikely prospect for alternative conduits to the North Korean government developing in that country that could be influenced by or involved with security interaction with external actors; and (2) the capacity of key external actors – China and the United States – to reach sufficient accord to coordinate development assistance, nuclear diplomacy and other key aspects of their policies toward North Korea that will not be “played off” each other by the North Korean regime. The prospect of either of these conditions being met over the short-term is limited and the risks to Northeast Asian stability in the absence of such a modus vivendi are intensifying. In the absence of either factor developing more positively, the outlook for human security applications improving the Korean peninsula’s current predicaments is relatively bleak.

North Korea’s ruling Kim family and its supporters have underwritten regime legitimacy and survival by perpetuating a cult of personality inherited from the founder of North Korea, Kim Il-sung, and by deliberately isolating the North Korean populace from exposure to the outside world. This practice is applied to various NGOs working to extend food supplies and disaster relief to a North Korean populace that is often confronted with starvation, flooding and forced labour. In March 2009, for example, the Food Assistance Program underwritten by the United States Agency for International Development was discontinued when the five humanitarian groups involved with food distribution were expelled from the country just before it conducted missile tests and a nuclear weapons test (Young 2009; Hsu 2010). Total political control with no exception remains the most important objective for a North Korean leadership that interprets any dissent or potential for it as directly threatening national security. The North Korean political system is justified to its populace in the following terms: ‘[t]he Korean people are too pure-blooded, and so too virtuous, to survive in this evil world without a great parental leader’ (Myers 2010). Under such conditions where the individual’s rights and welfare are deemed a primary threat by North Korean national authorities determined to retain their political authority at all costs, the probabilities for human security initiatives to take hold in North Korean society are remote.

The North Korean leadership’s Achilles heel is its complete failure to manage North Korea’s resources or economy and its nearly complete dependence on external sources for food and fuel supplies. A united international community might leverage this condition in ways that would facilitate greater political moderation within North Korea. No such accord exists as China has elected to underwrite the current North Korean regime’s survival with the rationale that confronting the

9 Myers is a leading authority on North Korean propaganda who teaches at Busan University.
New Approaches to Human Security in the Asia-Pacific

North would only further destabilise Northeast Asia. Despite its anger over North Korea’s three nuclear weapons tests conducted in October 2006, May 2009 and February 2013, China’s historical and ideological ties with North Korea remain a powerful rationale for sustaining trade ties and humanitarian assistance to the North. During the first half of 2010, China’s trade with North Korea totalled approximately US$1.3 billion—a 15.8 per cent rise over the same timeframe in 2009 (Reuters 2010). According to various estimates, China provides up to 80 per cent of North Korea’s consumer goods, 90 per cent of its energy imports and nearly half of its food (Bajoria 2009). Following massive flooding throughout many parts of North Korea in the late summer of 2010, the official Korean News Central Agency reported that the Chinese government had announced the provision of an ‘unspecified amount’ of emergency relief materials (news.com.au 2010). This trend was reaffirmed in August 2012 with an important visit to Beijing by Kim Jong-un’s uncle and key adviser, Jang Song-thaek, which resulted in a Chinese commitment to help North Korea develop special economic zones along the Chinese-North Korean border (Choe 2012).

This intensification of the Chinese-North Korean economic conduit has been occurring simultaneously with the United States move to stiffen sanctions against the North Korean regime in retaliation for Pyongyang’s suspected masterminding of the sinking of the Cheonan and in response to a failed North Korean missile test in April 2012. China wanted to preserve what it viewed as a stable situation on the Korean peninsula, notwithstanding how other external powers viewed North Korean behaviour. The alternatives to doing so, it surmised, could only be worse: the massive influx of North Korean refugees into Chinese territory in the event of North Korea incurring a regime implosion or the outbreak of conflict between North and South Korea which could result in US and allied forces defeating North Korea and occupying much or all of the Korean peninsula adjacent to China’s current 1400 kms border with North Korea.

Traditional national security policy approaches are currently prevailing over human-centric approaches in responding to North Korea’s substantial economic crisis and to its political differences with much of the international community. The United States and South Korea have adopted hardline postures, including the conduct of joint military exercises and the imposition of crippling economic sanctions, in response to what they deem to be excessively belligerent North Korean provocations. This posture is supported by much of the Western alliance system and by regional actors such as Japan, Australia and several ASEAN members, but not to the same degree by China or Russia. This remains true notwithstanding the unanimous passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2087 in January 2013. It is questionable, however, if Chinese and Russian policy approaches are motivated any more by human security concerns than their Western counterparts.

China appears to be most concerned about stemming any tide of North Korean refugees into China during times of war or crisis and has signed an agreement with North Korea that calls for enforced repatriation of any North Korean found illegally on Chinese territory (Strother 2010; Ji 2010). Perhaps equally salient is
China’s aforementioned concern about any future implosion of the North Korean leadership that would lead to a unified Korean peninsula potentially hostile to itself. Russian leaders likewise still view the Korean situation predominantly as an opportunity to enhance their own country’s strategic influence in Northeast Asia (Kwon 2010). Western news agencies have reported that just some of the thousands of North Korean labourers who defected from terrible working conditions in forest areas near Amur in the Russian Far East over the past two decades have recently been systematically assisted by Russian human rights organisations (BBC Newsnight 2009).

In current circumstances, prospects that state-centric and human-centric security politics will intersect in a North Korean context remain low. There is little or no chance of an alternative form of domestic leadership that would embrace a human security ethos rising to challenge the Kim regime any time soon, short of North Korea’s total implosion (an unlikely occurrence). A fresh resurgence of US and South Korean planning toward updating deterrence strategy targeted against the North seems to have had little effect on Kim Jong-un’s bellicose rhetoric or provocative behaviour directed against American and South Korean force deployments on or adjacent to the Korean peninsula (Cheon 2012; NTI 2012). The key external actors in this case - China and the United States - have been unable to coordinate their policies toward the North to the extent that their development assistance, humanitarian relief or political interaction with North Korea are sufficiently harmonious to avoid Pyongyang from leveraging for its own strategic advantage. The plight of individual North Koreans suffering from fear and want has been buried in the process. Accordingly, the two key factors designated here for securing effective balancing between human security and national security - human security measures modulating regime oppression and effective external power coordination - are lacking in the North Korean case.

The ‘Arc of Crisis’

The ‘arc of crisis’ (also commonly termed the ‘arc of instability’) in the South Pacific became a growing concern to Australia and New Zealand - the two developed ‘Pacific powers’ - during the late 1980s and intensified over the following two decades. Two political coups in Fiji in May and September 1987 represented the first forcible takeover of power in a Pacific Island state. These were followed by the Bougainville crisis (1988-1997). Military contingents from Australia and New Zealand were involved in a peacekeeping role in Bougainville, but those two countries refrained from intervening in the 1987 Fiji episodes or in two subsequent coups there in 2000 and 2006. In September 1999, an Australian-led International Force East Timor deployed to that locale in response to widespread violence precipitated by pro-Indonesian militia after a referendum to separate from Indonesia was overwhelmingly passed by the East Timorese. In June 2003, Australia again led an intervention force to a South Pacific country - the Regional
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands – constituted largely of Pacific Island Forum member-state defence forces. New Caledonia also experienced domestic political turbulence throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Vanuatu suffered political turmoil in 1988, 2001 and 2005, although open violence was successfully averted in that country.

Common denominators underlying these incidents involve a wide mixture of state-centric and human-centric factors. These include common colonial experiences leading to the formation of weak and fragmented states in a Melanesian sub-region populated by historically unfriendly ethnic groups, sharp disparities in wealth and education between urban and rural inhabitants, endemic land and resource disputes, governmental corruption, nepotism and mismanagement, and a lack of capacity to respond to natural disasters or other non-traditional security challenges (these are designated by May 2003: 11-12). In the context of the structured focused comparison approach adopted in this chapter, the first criterion – an uncontested domestic political regime – is only partially evident. The second factor – a lack of external coordination in response to state-centric and human-centric crises in South Pacific locales – is evident; only Australia, New Zealand and the South Pacific Forum have adopted actual conflict stabilisation postures over the past decade.

Australian and New Zealand roles may be increasingly challenged as South Pacific (and particularly Melanesian) states begin to assert greater foreign policy independence by cultivating a wider array of external relationships with different kinds of states. Commodore Frank Bainimarama’s seizure of power in Fiji during a December 2006 coup d’etat was the most significant development illustrating this trend. Significantly, Australia and New Zealand rejected a request by the about-to-be deposed government leader, Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase, to intervene against the Fijian Army (which was loyal to Bainimarama) at the time. In retrospect, as Matthew Hill (2010: 111) has suggested:

"The strategic reality in late-2006 was that Canberra and Wellington faced a committed target over which they held little credible short-term leverage ... For the Australasian powers, attempts at strongly and publically deterring Bainimarama carried the risks of forcing the RFMF’s [Royal Fijian Military Forces’] hand, while playing into the regional discourse of neo-colonial interventionism that had gained ground particularly in Melanesia following the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands."

During the ensuing years, Fiji has maintained fractious ties with its two largest Pacific neighbours. Australia and New Zealand imposed travel bans on Fijian government leaders and implemented financial restrictions in response to what they viewed as the Bainimarama government’s violations of basic freedoms (especially in the areas of political dissent, legal affairs and media control) and human rights. Fiji retaliated by forging intermittent coalitions with other Melanesian states that are, at times, prone to view Australia and New Zealand as
Asia-Pacific

was largely of Pacific Island States and also experienced domestic upheavals. Vanuatu suffered political instability which was successfully averted.

Conflict stabilisation postures are increasingly challenged as South Pacific states seek greater foreign policy autonomy. The most significant development was Fiji's seizure of power by Commodore Bainimarama, which New Zealand and Australia have consistently sustained a human security approach toward. Advocates of this approach would point to what they view as recent signs that Bainimarama was 'softening' his authoritarian rule as a verification of this posture's effectiveness. Indeed, more recent developments in the 'Fiji story' could be interpreted as being relatively positive. In late July 2012, Australian Foreign Minister Bob Carr and his New Zealand counterpart, Murray McCully, met with Fiji Foreign Minister Inoke Kubuobola and agreed to restore full diplomatic representation to Fiji two years after Australia's and New Zealand's high commissioners were forced to leave Suva. Travel bans on Fiji civilians working for the Bainimarama regime would also be lifted (although they would remain in place for Fiji military personnel).

Throughout the Bainimarama years, Australia and New Zealand have consistently sustained a human security approach toward the South Pacific that assigns 'freedom from fear' equal weight to 'freedom from want' - as their sanctions policies and other hardline measures have endeavoured to underscore. Advocates of this approach would point to what they view as recent signs that Bainimarama was 'softening' his authoritarian rule as a verification of this posture's effectiveness.

Indeed, more recent developments in the 'Fiji story' could be interpreted as being relatively positive. In late July 2012, Australian Foreign Minister Bob Carr and his New Zealand counterpart, Murray McCully, met with Fiji Foreign Minister Inoke Kubuobola and agreed to restore full diplomatic representation to Fiji two years after Australia's and New Zealand's high commissioners were forced to leave Suva. Travel bans on Fiji civilians working for the Bainimarama regime would also be lifted (although they would remain in place for Fiji military personnel).

This partial rapprochement was largely based on a more optimistic reading of Fiji's progress toward restoring more democratic practices as it moves toward conducting democratic elections after September 2014 (Callick 2012).

It may also, however, have been the product of traditional national security calculations related to geopolitics: more specifically, a reassessment in Canberra and Wellington about how futile the imposition of sanctions and a hardline posture led by Australia and New Zealand diplomats - especially within the somewhat irrelevant and moribund confines of the South Pacific Forum - really were. Throughout 2012, Washington reportedly urged Australian officials to moderate their policy out of concerns that Fiji was moving closer to China in response to Australian/New Zealand diplomacy, possibly handing the Chinese disproportionate influence in such bodies as the MSG at a time when the United States planned to upgrade its own Pacific Island strategic presence as a means of bridging vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean with its newly announced staging post in Darwin (Herr and Bergin 2011).

For in-depth background on Pacific Island politics-security issues, see Herr and Bergin (2011). The authors note that while China is a major bilateral diplomatic actor in the region and a significant aid donor to it, Chinese officials are primarily interested in preventing the Pacific Islands from being used against China rather than in dominating the region (Herr and Bergin 2011: 33).

Membership of the MSG includes Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front in New Caledonia.
Non-traditional security initiatives in the arc of crisis have been relatively few and only modestly successful. As Richard Herr and Anthony Bergin have observed, this can be attributed in part to the reality that regional security challenges are both national and transnational (Herr and Bergin 2011: 35). The South Pacific Forum’s 2005 ‘Pacific Plan’ designated law enforcement and security along with economic growth, sustainable development and good governance as ‘pillars’ or priorities in developing regional stability and prosperity. To date, however, and with few exceptions (such as the regulation of regional fisheries) progress has been mixed in meeting these objectives. Health risks, climate change, food security, energy prices, demographic change and disaster management all represent extraordinary tests for the region’s underdeveloped resource infrastructures that are often riddled with corruption and technological deficiencies.

How well Pacific states are able to contain their vulnerability to external parties and forces while developing new approaches for shaping and pursuing common regional objectives and strategies will constitute a major test of the feasibility of integrating state-centric and human security paradigms. To date, the first variable nominated for this chapter’s case study approach – modifying state domination over its populace (the ‘freedom from fear’ factor) – has clearly receded into the background if one considers recent developments as a valid measure of human security progress. The second factor – external state-centric competition – seems less problematic only because China and the United States have both remained resigned not to impose their sharpening Asia-Pacific and global competition directly into the arc of crisis. This may change, however, if China’s commercial interests (fisheries development and mining ventures) increase substantially over the next decade and/or the US begins to view parts of Polynesia and Melanesia as a critical geographic bridge to its Australian presence.

**Conclusion: Human Security and State-Centric Security – Chasing an Elusive Nexus**

This chapter’s two case studies have illustrated several fundamental preconditions for achieving a nexus between human security and state-centric politics – or what Gregory MacCallion (see Chapter 12 in this volume) terms the ‘adaptation’ or ‘transformation’ components of his national security framework. Until these preconditions are met, the prospects for human security gaining substantial ground in the calculations of states’ national security managers will remain distant.

First, geopolitics continues to trump states’ policymakers’ readiness to shift their concerns toward their populace’s internal security and prosperity. This is hardly surprising in the cases of both North Korea and the arc of crisis because these states remain highly fragile and vulnerable to external challenges to the political elite’s survival. Under such circumstances, state identity remains central and the enhancement of citizens’ lives and prosperity can only be viewed as an incidental and long-term side-benefit.
Second, external states' efforts to infuse human security benefits into these sovereignties in conformity with the 'freedom from want' criterion have been, at best, only partially successful. Outside aid is often received begrudgingly and has been manipulated, particularly in North Korea, to reinforce the authority of state-based institutions and practices. In the arc of crisis, the 'responsibility to protect' has experienced qualified success as the Bougainville and Solomon Islands episodes attest – but there have been no 'responsibility to protect' operations seriously considered for regimes such as North Korea or Fiji who command sufficiently strong armies to make the cost of military intervention just too great to enforce human security norms. There is no immediate solution to this dichotomy as developed states – tired of absorbing military casualties in distant wars without clear outcomes and stretched to the limits financially – are unlikely to engage in future military operations unless their own state survival is threatened.

Nevertheless, human security continues to factor into international politics as a benchmark for advancing the norms found in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other covenants focused on addressing and advancing the rights of individuals in an increasingly complex and often more threatening world. Diplomatic progress does intermittently occur as illustrated by the Six-Party Talks involving North Korea, and Australia’s and New Zealand’s recent adjustments in their previously hardline foreign policies directed toward Fiji. Sanctions are sometimes counterbalanced by disaster relief efforts geared toward modifying the effects of famine, flooding and internecine conflicts.

Perhaps the most fundamental precondition for integrating human security and national security is to encourage state policymakers, whenever possible, to relate and justify their security policy rationales and behaviour to explicit gains for their populaces. This goes beyond the dissemination of propaganda or rhetoric that automatically equates state interests as synonymous with the interests of those governed by the state. It instead subjects those elites and policymakers previously accustomed to referring to the state and its people as a unitary actor to become more explicit in terms of linking what their regimes are doing relative to the long-term benefits for their citizens. The venues of accountability for implementing this standard are hardly limited. They include international institutions, those regimes to which state-centric actors belong, epistemic communities and an increasingly sophisticated and globalised international community-at-large.

A second precondition, as Sonpong Peou has observed, is to ensure that the human security approach focuses ‘on the most important sources of threat to human security’ so as to avoid human security meaning everything to everyone. Deriving consensus on ‘what matters most’ to people’s survival and welfare is a key priority in shaping human security policies and ensuring that it will relate meaningfully to those who pursue policy on the basis of interests as well as ideals (see Peou 2009: 143–5). Such consensus is best derived in liberal democracies, reflected by both the institutional checks and balances these countries impose on their own leaderships and by their sustained campaigns to infuse international egalitarian and humane norms.
The first precondition can potentially moderate the forces of political extremism within states and thus help avoid a government’s arbitrary control of its people’s destinies through the process of securitisation (as MacCallum notes in Chapter 12). With respect to the second precondition, promoting more humane norms externally is best done when liberal democracies are in accord with the type of human security they wish to endorse and export.

Ultimately, those who would embrace human security approaches as the desired standards for security behaviour share the responsibility with those elites whom they often target to cultivate and shape an Asia-Pacific and global security environment that is more conducive to realising such standards. Absent of such an arrangement, effective sharing of the nexus between human and state-centric security will remain elusive.

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The Asia-Pacific is the force of political government's arbitrary control of the situation (as MacCaull notes in China, promoting more human relations are in accord with the type of security approaches as the responsibility with those elites Pacific and global security high standards. Absent of such a human and state-centric

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